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Abstract
Airlines participating in alliances offer code share itineraries (with flight segments
operated by different partners) to expand the range of origin-destination combina-
tions offered to passengers, thus increasing market share at little cost. The presence
of code share flights presents a problem for airline revenue management (RM) sys-
tems, which aim to maximize revenues in an airline's network by determining which
booking requests are accepted. Because partners do not jointly optimize revenues on
code share flights, alliance revenue gains from implementing advanced RM methods
may be lower than an individual airline's gains. This thesis examines seat availability
control methods that alliance partners can adopt to improve the total revenues of the
alliance without formally merging. Partners share information about the opportunity
costs to their network, called "bid prices", of selling a seat on their own flight leg, a
mechanism termed bid price sharing (BPS).
Results show that BPS methods often improve revenues and work best for net-
works with certain characteristics and partners with similar RM systems that ex-
change recently calculated bid prices as often as possible. Gains are typically only
achieved if both alliance partners participate in the code share availability decision
(called dual control) rather than one partner only, but implementation of dual control
is more difficult for airlines in practice. In the best case scenario, gains of up to .40%
where achieved, which can translate into $120 million per year for the largest airlines.
In our simulations, BPS with dual control and frequent bid price calculation and ex-
change was the only method that produced consistently positive revenue gains in all
the scenarios tested. Therefore, alliance airlines must consider the trade off between
revenue gains and implementation difficulties of more frequent bid price exchange or
dual control.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, airline alliances have been growing in importance to airlines and
passengers. The first global alliance, Star Alliance, was formed in 1997, followed by
oneworld (1999) and SkyTeam (2000). As of the completion of this thesis, these three
alliances currently have a joint total of 58 members. In 2010, they accounted for
about 60% of worldwide airline traffic in terms of passenger-kilometers flown (Back-
ofen, 2010). Table 1.1 presents some facts about the 3 global alliances.
Alliance Star Alliance SkyTeam oneworld
Members* 27 17 1
Formed 1997 2000 1999
Passengers (millions) 679 531 324
Destinations Served 1,356 983 870
Countries 193 178 152
% Market Sharet (Revenue Passenger Kilometers) 26.4 16.6 15.9
Revenue ($billions) 182 149 106
$ per Employee (000s) 417 359 382
$ per Aircraft (000s) 41,056 37,176 42,130
Flights 21,555 14,816 9,239
Lounges 990+ 503 584
Employees 436,000 414,686 277,500
Aircraft 4,433 4,008** 2,1
*Including members elect. tFor the year 2010. **Including affiliated carriers.
Sources: Company websites, and Backofen (2010)
Table 1.1: Global Alliances Facts and Figures for 2011
Cooperation between airlines for mutual benefit has been occurring much longer
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than the existence of global alliances. A variety of coordination activities can be
undertaken by participating airlines for their mutual benefit, with the goal of both
improving revenues and cutting costs. Figure 1-1 presents a list of cooperation ac-
tivities that airlines may engage in, in order of increasing commitment. This thesis
focuses on code sharing, which occurs when a flight leg operated by one carrier is mar-
keted and sold by another carrier under a different flight designator code. Though
code sharing is extensively practiced within global alliances, it also occurs domesti-
cally in regional alliances and on a route-specific basis among carriers outside of an
alliance, and need not imply that further cooperation is undertaken.
I Alliance Activity
& Code sharing (the topic addressed in this thesis)
E Scheduling of flight arrival and departure times
E Location of arrival and departure gates
E Joint frequent flyer programs
o Share of airport lounges and other ground facilities
Share of passenger services like baggage handling and check-in
r Share of support services like maintenance and catering
Fn Share of distribution and retailing functions
D Joint purchasing of such items as fuel, passenger service goods and aircraft
t. Joint advertising campaigns and creation of a common brand
Joint allocation of resources (fleet and crew planning)
Equity investment in partner's stock
Figure 1-1: Activities Engaged in by Alliances in Order of Increasing Commitment.
Adapted from de la Torre (1999)
To better understand code sharing, first consider the differences between supply
and demand for air travel. Airline supply consists of flight legs operated from one
airport to another, whereas consumers demand transportation from their origin city
to their destination. A ticketed customer flies on an itinerary that may consist of
a single (local) flight leg, or may require connections and consist of multiple flight
legs. The three flight legs shown in Figure 1-2 allow a number of origin-destination
(O-D) combinations to be sold to customers (3 local, 2 single connection, and 1
double-connection itinerary).
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In this example, alliance partner United Airlines (UA) operates the flights from
Denver (DEN) to Chicago (ORD) and ORD to Frankfurt (FRA), and Lufthansa (LH)
operates the flight from FRA to Budapest (BUD). The asterisk (*) indicates that the
flight is marketed as a code share. The alliance partner that sells the itineraries is
referred to as the marketing partner. The partner that operates the code share flight
leg, which was sold by a code share partner, is called the operating partner. The
three components of alliance traffic are:
1. Own local passengers traverse a single flight leg such that their origin and
destination are those of the flight leg. In this example, a passenger flying DEN
to ORD is an own local passenger of operating and marketing airline UA.
2. Own connecting passengers traverse multiple flight legs of the same airline to
go from their origin to their destination. A passenger flying from DEN to FRA
via ORD, with all flights operated and marketed by UA, is an own connecting
passenger of UA.
Local Itinerary Code Share Itinerary
~~jtifler.§!Y. Ij~ J LH 1334
E~ Parter± ~ PajjJ L -,> ftrtnerlr ~j
, UA618 UA944 , UA*9006
Connecting Itinerary
Figure 1-2: Traffic Components in Alliances
3. Code share passengers traverse one (or more) flight legs of the airline selling
the code share itinerary (the marketing carrier) and one (or more) legs oper-
ated by the operating carrier. A code share flight that is operated by another
carrier is designated by the marketing airline's code, such as United's UA or
Lufthansa's LH, followed by an asterisk to indicate that the flight is operated
by a partner. In this example, the flight number associated with the ORD to
FRA flight leg is either UA944 or LH*9153, depending on which airline sold the
itinerary. A passenger flying from ORD to BUD, having booked through either
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UA or LH, using UA's operated flight leg ORD to FRA, and LH's operated
flight leg FRA to BUD, is a code share passenger.
1.1 Code Sharing for Competitive Advantage
Passenger airlines engage in code sharing in an effort to improve market share by
providing access to new O-D markets and airports at a much smaller incremental op-
erating cost than if an airline were to use its own aircraft and own station personnel.
The first code sharing agreement went into effect in 1967, when Allegheny Airlines
code shared to cut costs by using a regional carrier that could economically serve
small short-haul markets because it had smaller aircraft (Oster and Pickrell, 1988).
Code sharing with regional (also called commuter) carriers is extremely common in
US domestic markets, where the larger network carrier feeds its long-haul routes with
passengers from smaller markets, supplied by regional carriers. Network airlines such
as Delta even use brand recognition to improve perceived seamlessness, such as flights
marketed as Delta Connection.
The first international code sharing agreement was signed in 1985 between Qan-
tas and American Airlines (Gellman Research Associated, 1994), and provided the
Australian carrier with access to the US domestic market, and vice versa. Code share
agreements between two large international airlines can provide more symmetric ben-
efits than regional alliances because the international routes are fed by each partner's
domestic network. The local member airline is familiar with its own local market,
and passengers are familiar with their local airline. An allied airline entering a new
market does not need to build its own network and gain market share, but rather
relies on its partner to feed traffic, and effectively expands its network coverage as if
it served its partner's destinations.
Airlines also code share with carriers outside of their alliances for marketing and
ease of interline ticket sales, both domestically and internationally. However, these
types of point-to-point agreements are not usually for strategic reasons, as are the
international alliances, which are more strongly integrated. An agreement founded
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on long term goals can be termed strategic (de la Torre, 1999).
Access to an operating partner's seats depends on the type of agreement (Vinod,
2004). Block space arrangements allow the marketing partner to buy a number of
seats from the operating carrier at a fixed price, and the seat inventory available to
the operating carrier is reduced. The marketing carrier then controls the sale of those
seats as if they were its own. Agreements are usually in place to allow the repurchase
of unused block space seats by the operating carrier as needed. Free sale agreements
allow direct access to the operating partner's inventory as long as there are seats
available at the ticket fare level, and are more prevalent than block space agreements,
according to Vinod (2004). This thesis assumes a free sale arrangement between the
alliance partners.
There are different types of code sharing agreements, depending on the intent of
the airlines. For example, the intent may be to create an internationally recognized
alliance brand, or to provide service to small regional markets that are fed from a
larger domestic market. The various types of code sharing agreements are summarized
below (adapted from Jain (2011)).
1. Parallel code sharing occurs between two partners on a route which is oper-
ated by both of them, such as flights between their hubs.
2. Complementary code sharing occurs when partners use each others' flights
to provide connecting service to markets which are out of their own network.
Complementary code sharing increases the number of destinations served by
an airline, thus attracting passengers without incurring incremental operating
costs.
3. Strategic code sharing occurs on a vast number of routes so as to strategi-
cally link both airlines' networks. Seats are accessed between the partners using
a free sale agreement (de la Torre, 1999), so as to provide seamless availability.
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1.2 Potential Impacts of Code Sharing
There can be benefits and detriments attributed to the practice of code sharing. Pas-
sengers can benefit from a larger choice of flight itineraries and fares resulting from
the expansive networks of alliances, as well as seamless check in, connecting flight
transfers, baggage transfers, and aggregate earnings on an alliance's participating
frequent flier programs. An important revenue source for the alliances, business pas-
sengers especially benefit from faster status achievement on coordinated frequent flier
programs and lounge access.
If a code share agreement results in reduced service frequency, flight options de-
crease, and the resulting scheduled flights may not satisfy the passenger in terms
of desired departure or arrival times. Reduced competition on hub-to-hub flights
may also result in more market power for the supplying airline, thus causing price
increases. Brueckner (2001) found that prices on most routes decreased as a result
of code sharing in alliances. However, the opposite occurred for hub-to-hub routes
(routes between the alliance hubs), where the service frequency is higher, thus pro-
viding a better level of service to customers, and resulting in greater market share for
the combined alliance, as well as higher prices for customers.
If code sharing results in the consolidation of flights between hubs into a single
flight with a larger airplane, this can also provide environmental benefits. Costly pas-
senger delays at the participating airports could be reduced, where the delays from
congestion caused by intense schedule competition of airlines (Vaze, 2011) are a nega-
tive externality that may be corrected by market forces in the case of airline alliances.
1.3 Motivation for this Research
In the absence of alliances, an airline carries its own local and connecting passengers,
and the sale of interline itineraries is governed by the rules set forth by the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA) concerning Multilateral Interline Traffic
Agreements. Payments to the operating carrier, for the services of carrying passengers
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and other services such as baggage handling, are processed through the IATA clearing
house. Adding code share agreements presents two new challenges, namely managing
the code share flight requests and dividing the revenues among the partners according
to alliance agreements, which may then be modified on a bilateral or route-specific
basis between individual airlines. This thesis discusses and proposes solution options
for the problem of managing code share flight requests for the improvement of joint
alliance revenues.
The practice of code sharing evolved from interlining, but requires a deeper com-
mitment among the participants than simple interlining. Although it is possible for
a passenger to buy an itinerary that consists of the same flight legs as an interline
itinerary himself (by purchasing separate local tickets from the two airlines) flying
on an interline ticket is easier, typically less expensive, and uses a single ticket with
coordinated baggage handling. Code sharing allows the marketing carrier to also add
its own designator code to the itinerary and market it as its own product, which pro-
vides the added benefit of appearing earlier than interline ticket options on a travel
agent's reservations screen.
Parallels and relevant research findings can be extended to other industries where
two or more service providers must coordinate their service activities to provide the
customer with a single product that can be sold by either service provider. The most
common research examples can be found in freight shipping and airline cargo, where
different providers transport goods along different segments of the itinerary. The cus-
tomer requesting the transport of goods is indifferent to the route along which they
are transported and by whom, and it is up to the service providers to determine how
they will cooperate to service the customer.
The practice of revenue management (RM) intends to maximize revenues through
allocation of seats on individual flight legs to different O-D passengers. Different prices
can be charged for the same seats because passengers have different willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for their flights due to the market characteristics of the many different O-D
city pairs served by each flight (further explained in Chapter 2). Without alliances,
each airline's RM system maximizes the individual airline's revenues, considering
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only local and connecting traffic. The existence of code share traffic is problematic
for RM. An important concern must be addressed: how to determine availability for
code share itineraries.
Modern revenue management systems estimate "bid prices", which represent the
value to the network of empty seats on an airline's flight legs, and may be viewed as
an opportunity cost to the airline of filling a seat and removing it from the available
inventory. The bid prices are calculated by the revenue management system, and can
be quite different, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Using a simulation model called
the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS), this thesis examines a method
called bid price sharing, in which airlines exchange bid prices to inform each other of
the opportunity cost of selling a partner's seat as part of a code share itinerary. It is
hypothesized that bid price sharing produces improved control of seat availability for
the alliance's code share itineraries and increases total alliance revenues. This thesis's
goal is to present the range of revenue gains, and the effects on local, connecting, and
code share traffic and revenues of alliance partners, resulting from different forms of
bid price sharing. The range of changes depends on bid price calculation, the struc-
ture of the alliance networks, the timeliness of their exchange and recalculations, and
whether both or one partner participate in the availability decision. The causes of
the revenue changes and the trade-offs facing the airlines concerning the methods'
implementation are discussed.
1.4 Overview of the Thesis
Chapter 1 introduced why alliances are significant to industry and consumers. Air-
line alliances were defined, including the reasons for their formation, key activities
engaged in by alliances, including the impacts of code sharing in particular, and the
motivation for this thesis was discussed. Chapter 2 gives the reader background on
relevant prior work in revenue management. It then reviews more recent literature
on alliances, namely work on managing code share itinerary requests and division
of code share revenues. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used in the research
24
experiments, providing an overview of PODS, the structure of the two hypothetical
alliance network environments used in our experiments, and the dimensions of bid
price sharing tested in the thesis experiments.
Chapter 4 presents the findings of bid price sharing among alliance partners in
a hypothetical four-airline US-based network with a single alliance consisting of 2
partner airlines. It gives the range of changes when alliance partners use various
combinations of revenue management methods, types of bid prices, and management
of code share availability. Chapter 5 presents results in a trans-Atlantic network
with 2 competing alliances, and examines the differences in the results from the
structurally-different US network. Conclusions related to the findings of the thesis
and implications for airlines are presented in the last chapter, as well as recommen-
dations for future research.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
Revenue maximization for airlines occurs in stages: in the long-term with network and
fleet planning and in the medium term with scheduling, fleet and crew assignment. In
the short term, when the route, schedule and aircraft choices are fixed, the last chance
to improve revenues is the revenue management step. In this chapter, a brief overview
of revenue management in general is presented, referencing the relevant methods con-
sidered in this thesis, followed by revenue management as it relates to airline alliances,
focusing on the aspects relevant to the thesis experiments. Good reviews of revenue
management can be found in McGill and van Ryzin (1999) and Barnhart et al. (2003).
When airlines began offering discounted fare products with advance purchase re-
quirements in the 1970s, it became necessary to control the number of discounted
seats made available for sale. There was revenue to be gained from filling seats in
the economy cabin that would not otherwise be booked at full fares, but there was a
danger that discount fare passengers could displace later-booking full fare passengers
and cause revenue losses. Since US airline deregulation in 1978, fare structures have
evolved beyond the two-fare level (or fare class) distinction, with many fare classes
on offer.
2.1 Differential Pricing
Airlines typically offer multiple "fare products" to customers because the air transport
sector is a high-fixed cost industry, where traditional pricing strategies may not allow
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the recovery of costs. Airlines cannot price at marginal cost because the marginal
cost of flying an additional passenger is near zero if there are seats on the plane. As
illustrated in Figure 2-1, charging a single, revenue-maximizing price will not cover
costs if the average costs of producing a given quantity are higher than the price
consumers are willing to pay for that quantity. In this example, consumers demand
100 units at $200, but the airline must sell 120 to cover costs.
Airline cannot cover average costs with
Pric a single, revenue-maximizing price
100 seats are demanded, but
120 must be sold to cover costs
$2
100 120 Quantity
Figure 2-1: A Single Price Does Not Cover the Airline's Costs
Airlines practice price discrimination, or product differentiation, to cover their
costs. Often referred to as "differential pricing", the idea is to group passengers ac-
cording to their willingness-to-pay for travel, particularly into business and leisure
segments. For additional discussion on differential pricing, see Dar (2006) or Chapter
3 of Belobaba et al. (2009). The many discounted fares aimed at leisure passengers
come with restrictions (or fences) such as requirements on minimum stay, advanced
purchase, and non-refundability. These fences attempt to prevent the diversion to
discounted fares of business passengers who are willing to buy the restriction-free full
fare tickets.
The fare class distinctions, comprised of different price points and restrictions,
make up a "fare structure". Fare structures may be more or less restricted, depend-
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Figure 2-2: Example of Fully- and Semi-Restricted Fare Structures, developed for
Alliance Network A4 in Jain (2011)
ing on the number and strictness of fences applied to lower fare products. An example
of "fully" and "semi" restricted fare structures is provided in Figure 2-2. Successful
demand segmentation generates more revenue and higher load factors than charging
a single price in two ways: on the high end, from charging business passengers closer
to their WTP, and on the low end, by stimulating extra leisure demand from those
who would not pay the higher, profit-maximizing price, as illustrated in Figure 2-3.
Price Revenue from a single, revenue-maximizing price Price Revenue gains from multiple fare products
Consumer surplus
$3
$2 ~Differentiate $
products and.
segmentidemand
100 Quant 50 10 Quantity
Figure 2-3: Revenue Gains by Segmenting Demand using Fare Products
The determination of seat protections for the full fare passengers from the pas-
sengers who arrive earlier seeking discounted fares is called seat inventory control
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or seat allocation. These seat protections translate to booking limits on the lower
classes. An illustration of booking limits is provided in Figure 2-4. No simple rule
(such as protecting a percentage of seats) will maximize revenues, because demands
change by time, date, and market. Seat allocation methods include leg-based (which
maximizes revenues on an individual flight leg) and network-based (which attempts
to maximizes revenues over the entire network). Provided in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are
summaries of some of the key seat allocation methods that will be referenced in the
methodology and results portions of the thesis.
Capacity-
Protected for class 1
Booking limit on class 1 from classes 2 through n
(B13)=- Capacity
- Protectedfor classes 1 & 2
BL2= Cap - #seats ffrom classes 3 through n
BL3 = BL2 - # seats
proecte for class 29
1 2 3 Classes
Figure 2-4: Nested Booking Limits on Discounted Fare Classes, Adapted from
Cleaz-Savoyen (2005)
2.2 Forecasting
Seat allocation models require detailed forecasts of demand. Forecasts by fare class
of mean demand and variance are needed (by flight leg for leg-based optimization and
by itinerary for network-based). A method called pickup forecasting (or the additive
method) relies on averaging a number of historical observations of incremental book-
ings, or "pick up" (from the current day t up to departure), to obtain an estimate of
the number of bookings to come (i.e, forecast at departure (day 0) = actual bookings
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(day t) + average pickup (day t to 0)). A discussion of pickup forecasting can be
found in Skwarek (1996) on pp. 43-45. More information on forecasting can also be
found in the master's thesis of Zickus (1998).
There may be missing or incomplete observations in historical data for fare classes
if they were closed at any time by the seat allocator. Correcting for these observations
is called unconstraining. A simple method called booking curve unconstraining (also
called booking profile and multiplicative unconstraining in the literature) uses histor-
ical observations in which the fare class remained open up to departure. It obtains
a ratio of bookings at departure to the last day t that the fare class was open, (i.e.,
forecast at departure (day 0) = actual bookings (day t) * average pickup ratio(Day t
to Day 0). For more information and a comparison of the performance of forecasting
methods, refer to Weatherford and Kimes (2003), Weatherford and Polt (2002) and
Queenan et al. (2007).
2.3 Leg-Based Revenue Management
The early research on the seat allocation problem aimed to find booking limits on
seats available at discounted fares, on a single flight leg, so as to maximize expected
revenues. It was proposed by Littlewood (1972) that a discount fare booking should
be accepted if its revenue exceeds the expected revenue from future full fare book-
ings (i.e., the product of the full fare value with the probability of arrival of a full
fare booking request) and is referred to as Littlewood's Rule for the two class seat
inventory control problem.
2.3.1 Expected Marginal Seat Revenue
Littlewood's Rule was extended to multiple fare classes and termed EMSR (expected
marginal seat revenue) by Belobaba (1987) in his PhD thesis and subsequent paper
(Belobaba, 1989). The EMSR method was later refined to produce better results
and termed EMSRb. Though the EMSR heuristic does not produce optimal booking
limits for the multi-class case, it provides good approximations, as shown in McGill
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(1989) and Wollmer (1992), and is easy to implement compared to optimal but com-
putationally intensive methods (see also Curry (1990), Brumelle and McGill (1993).
The idea behind EMSR is to determine how many of the remaining seats on the
flight leg to protect for class 1 from earlier-arriving, class 2 or lower passengers. A
normal distribution of demand to come by fare class is constructed from forecasts.
The number of seats n in fare class k to protect from class k +1 depends on the fares
for classes k through k + 1, Fk, and the normal probability distribution (mean and
variance) of the demands Xk for each fare class.
Fk * Prob(xk > X) Fk+1 (2.1)
The idea is to protect the number of seats n for fare class k so long as the above
equation is satisfied. When there are multiple top fare classes (for example, classes 1
and 2) to protect from a lower class k + 1, weighted average fares, total demands and
joint variances are constructed for the multiple top classes before applying 2.1. The
method is also useful for providing expected values for each seat on a flight leg. The
critical EMSR value (or EMSRc) on a flight leg is the lowest valued available seat at
any given remaining available capacity. An illustration is provided in Figure 2-5. If
the demand for the flight leg is forecast to be high, then the EMSRc value will be
higher than if demand is forecast to be below capacity (in which case the probability
of filling the last seat will be small).
2.3.2 Heuristic Bid Price
Heuristic bid price (Belobaba, 2002) is a method that relies on historical data at
the flight leg level, but takes steps toward considering network effects. The idea is
to accept a connecting passenger if the fare exceeds the sum of the EMSRc values
of the flights legs that the connecting itinerary traverses, after modifying this sum
downwards. Downward modification is done to account for the potential displacement
of local passengers on the flight legs, because selling all the available seats on the
flight legs in question to local passengers would produce more revenue than selling
32
Class 1
Class Fare EMSR curve for Lclass3
Class 3Fare[ ---------- i-- -------- EMSRc value of Jast
1 T12 Capacity
Figure 2-5: Illustration of Expected Marginal Seat Revenue Curves and EMSRc
Value, Adapted from Cleaz-Savoyen (2005)
the connecting itinerary (in the same fare class). Let d represent the probability of
displacing a local passenger on the 1st flight leg times the probability of displacing a
local passenger on the second flight leg. We accept a connecting passenger if the fare
for itinerary j F exceeds the sum of the EMSRc values on flight legs 1 and 2, EMSRci
and EMSRc2 , with the smaller of the two multiplied by the displacement factor d.
F ;> Max(EMSRc1, EMSRc2) + d * Min(EMSRci, EMSRc2) (2.2)
2.4 Network-Based Revenue Management
Maximizing revenues at the network level requires finding limits on discounted fares
available, or simply deciding which booking requests to accept or reject, for each
origin-destination itinerary that traverses a flight leg. Mathematical formulations that
found optimal partitioned booking limits for each origin-destination fare, or ODF,
were not successful because booking limits were on each individual ODF, and were
not nested, so seats could go empty that might otherwise be sold to a different ODF re-
quest, or requests for a high-revenue ODF could be rejected because the booking limit
for that particular ODF had been reached. The benefits of nesting can be achieved by
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grouping different ODFs into virtual buckets, according to their revenue contribution
to the network. Booking limits can then be determined for the lower buckets. An-
other approach is to determine bid prices, or minimum values for a seat on a flight leg,
that an ODF's revenue must exceed. A discussion and analysis of origin-destination
control methods, and the use of shadow prices as opportunity costs, is provided in the
dissertation of Williamson (1992), and bid price techniques are discussed in Talluri
and van Ryzin (1998) . Two common approaches to O-D control are discussed below.
2.4.1 Displacement-Adjusted Virtual Nesting
With Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting, or DAVN, the idea is to determine a
value to the network of an ODF by considering its revenue contribution (the fare)
minus any opportunity costs that are incurred by the potential displacement of a local
passenger on the connecting leg. These displacement costs are estimated as follows.
A network linear program is formulated to maximize revenue over the network, where
the decision variables, 4 , are the number of seats to make available to itinerary j
(where j may traverse one or more flight legs i) in fare class k. The demands, d ,
are assumed to be deterministic, and are set to the mean demand forecasts. The
constraints require that the decision variables do not exceed the mean forecasted de-
mands, and that the number of seats allocated per flight leg i does not exceed fight
leg capacity Ci. The shadow prices, SP, associated with the leg capacity constraints
provide a value for occupying the last seat on the flight leg. Note that if the mean
demand forecast is below capacity, then the shadow price will be zero.
Booking limits for ODFs are determined at the flight leg level by considering the
total fare of the ODF and subtracting from it the shadow prices on the other flight
legs traversed by the itinerary. A local ODF will be placed in a revenue bucket
corresponding to its total fare, as will an ODF for which the shadow prices on the
connecting flight legs are zero. However, if a shadow price on a connecting flight leg
is greater than zero, then the network value of an ODF will be smaller than its total
fare, and may be placed in a lower revenue bucket. The booking limits on the virtual
buckets are determined according to the EMSR heuristic, and a booking request is
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accepted if the bucket, into which the ODF falls, is open. Stated another way, the
ODF revenue, F, less the sum of the shadow prices on the remaining connecting flight
legs, Eij, SP, must exceed the minimum of the lowest open bucket Bmi as follows.
F SP ;> Bin (2.3)
DAVN is quite a robust network RM method because it uses multiple fare level
ranges to determine booking availability; therefore, its results are less sensitive to
small variability in historical input data or demand forecasting methods. One main
weakness of DAVN is that its network optimizer treats demand as deterministic, al-
though information about the probability distribution of demand is accounted for
through the application of EMSR to find virtual bucket booking limits.
Value Bucket FrRange Booking Class (minus Displacement Cost) Vle
Figure 2-6: Illustration of DAVN Virtual Bucketing with $100 Displacement Cost on
ORD-FRA Connecting Leg
2.4.2 Probabilistic Bid Price
Probabilistic bid price (ProBP) is a network RM method developed by Bratu (1998)
that relies exclusively on forecasts at the OD fare class level, optimizes over the entire
network, and does not use booking limits but rather bid prices as the booking control
mechanism. The idea behind the ProBP algorithm is to determine the bid price, or
network value of an available seat on a flight leg, using a prorated fare convergence
technique. The OD fares of connecting itineraries are prorated to the flight legs they
traverse according to the ratio of the EMRSc values of the affected legs, thus taking
into account the stochasticity of the demand forecasts. The first step uses the fore-
35
casted demand and total OD fares for itinerary j (which uses leg i) as input, denoted
Pj, to find EMSRc values on each flight leg. The prorated fares, denoted PRji, which
are used as fare input to the algorithm in subsequent steps, are then determined as
follows.
EMSRci * F-
L'ej EMSRci (2.4)
If the EMSRc values for any leg are found to be zero, then PR,i = , where lj
is the cardinality of itinerary j. An illustration of the ProBP algorithm process is
provided in Figure 2-7.
NO
YES
Bi pics s ooing~ conrol ehns
Figure 2-7: ProBP Algorithm, Adapted from Bratu (1998)
Because no booking limits are explicitly set, so long as the ProBP bid price equa-
tion is satisfied, the number of itineraries that can be booked at a fare level is unlim-
ited. In actuality, the value of the remaining seats on the network changes with every
booking that occurs, and the optimal approach would require recalculating the bid
prices after every accepted booking. This weakness of the bid price mechanism re-
quires that the bid prices be re-calculated very frequently (for example, every night).
Also, because of relying on OD fare class forecasts, the demand forecasts for an OD
pair in a given class may be very close to zero with high variation. The ProBP algo-
rithm appears to be sensitive to the accuracy of demand inputs as well, as compared
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with the robustness of the DAVN bucketing approach, but its performance improves
with higher demand and more accurate forecasts.
A summary of the levels (leg-based or network-based) at which the key elements in
RM (forecasting, optimization, booking control) take place for the four RM methods
described is provided in Table 2.1.
RM Level of Level of Optimization Level of Cont rol Mechanism
System iForecasting Control I
Leg< Legi Legmzion e4ae ooigLmt
EMSR -Foreasts Contro
HBP Leg LegOptimization Path-based Bid Prices (EMSRc adjusted
Forecasts Control for local displacement)
DAVN P'ath ~NetworkOptimization, Leg-based Booking Limits
Forecasts LegCapacit Constraints Contro
ProBP Path Network Optimization Path-based Bid Prices (Converged
Forecasts Control prorated fares)
Table 2.1: Comparison of Levels (Leg- or Network-Based) of Forecasting, Optimiza-
tion, and Booking Control, Adapted from Dar (2006)
2.5 Alliance Revenue Management
Although there is much research on the economic impacts of and motivation for airline
alliances, the research on revenue management in airline alliances is not extensive,
but has been increasing in recent years. Very little work has addressed the challenges,
practical, technological, and legal, of implementing some of the proposed schemes in
existing alliances. There are also very few studies of the willingness of airlines to co-
operate in their revenue management because of the risk that the individual airline's
revenues may not be maximized and the reluctance of airlines' RM departments to
cede control. In addition, there is also some work on interline cooperation in cargo
transportation (Houghtalen et al. (2011), Agarwal and Ergun (2008) and Agarwal
et al. (2009)), but the main differences from the passenger airline sector are that
demands for cargo transportation are realized before routing decisions and revenue
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sharing is determined, allowing the use of deterministic models to, for example, find
dual prices for the partner's capacity.
RAe/ording& Foecasting
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Codeshare Valuation LOCAL/ PRORATION
------------------- ------------ --------------
~ Seat Allocation Method LEG/O0
Passenger Parne
---------
aton t tro STANDARD/
I fA b yBD PRICE
PARTIAL ACCEPT/
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If Accepted
Figure 2-8: The Components of Alliance Revenue Management, Adapted from Jain
(2011)
Figure 2-8 illustrates the steps in revenue management for airline alliances. As
illustrated in Figure 2-8, the step of associating a valuation with the code share ODF
comes before the seat allocation step where booking availability is determined. After
all the revenues are collected, they must be allocated between the partners, which
is referred to as revenue "resolution" or "sharing". The operating carrier is paid a
"transfer price" for the use of each seat on his operated flight legs (his capacity). If
each carrier'values the code share itinerary according to the actual revenue he receives
for use of his seat inventory (equal to the transfer price for the operating carrier, and
to the fare minus the transfer price for the marketing carrier), then the revenue res-
olution amount is determined by the valuation. In that case, the revenue resolution
and the code share availability control problems are the same. If the transfer price is
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different from the valuation, then the goals of solving these two problems differ. The
aim of solving the booking availability control problem should be to maximize the
joint alliance revenues, and the goal of the revenue resolution problem should be to
prevent losses to any individual airline and ensure a fair split of the revenues.
This thesis focuses on the coordination of code share booking availability decisions
among the alliance partners and assumes that revenue resolution has been previously
decided in a manner deemed fair by the partners. However, this section does review
cases in the relevant literature where the resolution and availability control decisions
are intertwined.
The components of alliance RM in airlines are briefly described below and the
assumptions used in this thesis are stated. For more information on the implementa-
tion details of alliance revenue management in practice, good overviews can be found
in Jain (2011) and Vinod (2004).
Sub-Optimality of Alliance OD Revenue Management
Due to the presence of code share traffic, alliance revenue gains from using OD seat
allocation can be sub-optimal. This is because each partner optimizes revenues over
its own network according to its own RM system, and the resulting seat availability
for code share flights may not maximize alliance revenues, and may instead result in
cooperative or non-cooperative equilibria between the partners. This is exacerbated
because code share itineraries often involve long-haul international legs with high rev-
enue contribution. Attempts to quantify this revenue gap due to the presence of code
share traffic (Jain, 2011; Wright, 2010; Graf, 2011) have found that the gap depends
heavily on the characteristics of the particular network.
Although research in the field of operations research has attempted to address
the problem of alliance revenue management and propose optimal solutions, these
proposed approaches assume prerequisites that include having full information of the
state of the partner's system, recorded booking histories and forecasts, infinite compu-
tation time, and having the technical capability, antitrust immunity, and willingness
despite competitive concerns to share this information (see Wright et al. (2010) and
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Topaloglu (2012)).
2.5.1 Recording and Forecasting of Code Share Bookings
When recording and forecasting the demand for code share itineraries, better revenues
can be obtained if the historical database can distinguish code share bookings from
locals, as shown in Jain (2011). In that case, full information is needed from the book-
ing agent, such as a Global Distribution System (GDS). In this thesis, we assume that
the alliance partners use cascading, which records the full itinerary and allows distin-
guishing code share from local bookings in the historical database, as opposed to AVS,
which only sends messages about the availability status of certain classes on a flight
leg to the partner. For more information on cascading, and the alternative AVS, which
does not allow distinguishing the full O-D of code share bookings, refer to Jain (2011).
2.5.2 Valuation
Alliance revenues depend on the sale of own local and connecting itineraries as well
as code share itineraries. In turn, the availability of code share itineraries depends on
the revenue value of the code share demand that is provided as input to the seat al-
locator. This value is not in question for own locals and connecting itineraries, where
the contribution to the airline's revenues is simply equal to the fare for the itinerary.
In the case of code share itineraries, while it is clear that the revenue gain to the
alliance as a whole is equal to the code share fare, the question arises of how much
revenue contribution a code share booking provides to the individual airline. For
example, for an individual airline using DAVN, assigning a revenue value equal to the
total fare of the code share would place it in a high revenue bucket and result in very
good booking availability, increasing the chance that a seat is booked by a code share
passenger rather than a local passenger. Two valuation options, static valuation,
which remains the same throughout the booking process, and dynamic valuation,
which changes over time depending on the system parameters, are discussed below.
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Static Valuation
With a valuation that is static, or remains constant over the booking horizon, the
possibilities include using the total fare of the code share itinerary, the local fare of
the partner's own traversed flight leg (both total and local valuation can overvalue
the code share itineraries), or a proration of the total fare. Proration can be done,
for example, according to the ratio of the mileage traversed by the flight legs, or
according to the ratio of the highest local fares on the flight legs.
ORD IIIjjIi FRA I III :ji BUD
Booking (O-D) Marketing Airline O-D Fare Bid Price at Time t
ORD-BRA UA $200 $250
FRA-BUD LH $500 $300
ORD-BUD Codeshare (UA/LH) 1$600 
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Figure 2-9: Illustration of Code Share Valuation in RM Optimizer, Adapted from
Jain (2011)
Note that, in Figure 2-9, the sum of local values assigned to code share flight legs
exceeds the code share fare, effectively overvaluing the code share itinerary. In a net-
work where code share paths have high network value, this can increase revenues. In
this thesis, we use local valuation, as representative of current airline practices. Also,
it was shown in simulations in Jain (2011) that results achieved using local valuation
can exceed those of using prorated values, despite the fact that local valuation over-
values the code share itinerary's network contribution (the transfer price is usually a
prorate of the total fare, less than the local fare).
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Darot (2001) argues that overvaluing code share itineraries can reduce availability
for own locals and connections, and in turn, can reduce local and connecting revenues.
Therefore, the individual airline should avoid potentially harming its own revenues
that are not subject to revenue sharing agreements and value code shares according
to their contribution to the own airline. However, this approach may not maximize
revenues for the alliance, instead resulting in a non-cooperative equilibrium. It is also
worth noting that the bookings of own local and connecting itineraries has an effect
on the alliance partner that is not accounted for if the alliances perform separate
optimization. This effect can be seen as an opportunity cost to the partner (or
change in the partner's expected revenues) due to the removal of an airline's own
seat inventory that could have been used for code share bookings later on. For the
derivation of this opportunity cost in an alliance airline's value function using Bellman
equations, see Wright et al. (2010).
Dynamic Valuation
Jain (2011) proposes and tests a scheme called dynamic valuation, where the input to
the optimizer is the total code share fare minus the partner's bid price from the pre-
vious optimization (or time period). Figure 2-9 also provides an example of dynamic
valuation. The results are very encouraging and show revenue gains near to those of
BPS for code share availability control (expained in the next section) in DAVN, and
much better results in ProBP (about a .25% revenue gain for DAVN and ProBP). It
is argued that improved performance of ProBP under dynamic valuation is a result
of the sensitivity of the ProBP optimization to fare inputs. This thesis continues
the examination of dynamic valuation in the same and a different network setting,
with the exchange of current (not dated) bid prices and more frequent optimization
(calculation of bid prices and bookings limits) from that used by Jain, with results
presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
Wright et al. (2010) model a Markov game of perfect information, where each
partner knows the other's value function, and the functions are identical. The value
functions take the form of Bellman equations derived using a dynamic programming
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formulation of airline revenues during the time horizons of the booking process. Their
aim is to examine the proportion of "first best" revenues (the maximum revenues
that the alliance could earn as one airline) that can be attained by the partners
under various transfer price schemes, with the valuation of the code share itinerary
equal to the transfer price. They examine static (prorated) and 3 different dynamic
pricing schemes (bid prices, bid price ratios, and "partner prices" named by operating
carriers). In their analysis, the transfer price is the same as the code share valuation,
treating the two problems of alliance revenue management and resolution as identical.
Their findings show that the performance of static schemes is nearly as good as
the best dynamic schemes (achieving about 90% of first best revenues), but that
static schemes do not adjust well as network parameters change, which could rapidly
reduce revenues. Some dynamic schemes perform very well, and are able to adjust
to changing network parameters. However, their performance deteriorates if partners
post transfer prices to maximize their own revenues (for example, sending incorrect
bid prices or naming transfer prices that are too high), and this risk is acknowledged
by the authors.
It should be noted that the results obtained in Wright et al. (2010) are based on
simulations in a network consisting of just two flight legs with ten seats each, in which
the proportion of code share itineraries was varied. The authors acknowledge that
the computational complexity of finding the set of transfer prices is much too great
to apply their model to networks of realistic size, and that heuristic or approximation
approaches need to be developed.
2.5.3 Code Share Availability Control
Availability control refers to the step of accepting or rejecting a code share booking
request, and includes direct availability control by the marketing carrier and bid price
sharing control. With standard control by the marking carrier at local valuation, code
shares are treated as own local bookings and their booking availability is determined
during seat allocation. With bid price sharing, the partners share bid prices (or
DAVN network displacement costs, or EMSRc values) for their own operated legs
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on the code share itinerary and attempt to make informed accept/reject decisions
to benefit the alliance. Details regarding bid price sharing with single/dual airline
control are presented in Chapter 3. In the following two subsections, we describe
two code share availability control options, one where only the marketing partner is
responsible for the availability control of code share itineraries, and one where code
share availability control depends on both airline partners.
Direct Control by the Marketing Airline
Direct control refers to the case where the marketing carrier is responsible for deciding
whether to make a code share itinerary available for sale. This type of control deter-
mines availability of code share itineraries at the same time as local and connecting
itineraries. Accepting a code share booking will require receiving an AVS message
from the partner that the code share ODF is also available in the partner's system. It
treats code share itineraries either as part of the forecast for locals or separately from
locals, with their corresponding valuation (prorated, local, dynamic) used as the fare
input to the optimizer.
An option that could achieve optimal joint revenues, suggested by both Boyd
(1998) and Vinod (2004), is to exchange seats among the alliance partners until the
relative values of the seats to each airline's network are equal. After the seats are ex-
changed and paid for among the carriers, each airline has individual control over the
seats by his own RM system. Boyd formulated this proposition in terms of marginal
seat values, and Vinod in terms of bid prices, but the idea is the same. In the
proposed scenario, the resource allocation is optimal and expected revenue for the
alliance can be maximized. However, in practice, airlines do not calculate bid prices
or expected seat revenues for seats on flights that they do not operate, as they do
not have access to the booking histories and forecasts for those non-operated flights.
Significant technological changes to the airlines' RM systems and antitrust immunity
may be required before such a scheme could be implemented.
Applying finance theory, Graf and Kimms (2011) propose an options-based ap-
proach to capacity control on a single flight leg, where the marketing carrier can
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purchase options from the operating carrier for the right to buy seat inventory in
the future at a pre-determined strike price. They allow for dynamic inventory ad-
justment through the buy-back of inventory by the marketing carrier as demand is
realized during the booking process. Their model takes the options and strike prices
as given parameters, it does not consider network effects, and the authors acknowl-
edge that searching through the entire solution space for the optimal values of these
prices would be very time-consuming. In further work in her dissertation, Graf (2011)
presents and tests a fast-performing heuristic that allows applying the options-based
approach for determining the capacity controls within feasible calculation times. No
theoretical basis or evidence is presented that this scheme performs better than the
other methods proposed in the literature.
Topaloglu (2012) develops a deterministic LP model inspired by Williamson (1992)'s,
similar to the approach of DAVN. The LP is solved over the joint alliance network,
and then the constraints linking the partners' decisions to the joint alliance network
solution are relaxed through the dual prices, thus decomposing the problem into
smaller problems by airline. Autonomous direct control policies for each individual
airline are extracted from the results with valuation and revenue sharing according
to the dual prices. The author acknowledges that application of this methodology
would require airlines to truthfully share information about their pricing, demand
forecasts and remaining capacity, the legal and technical capability to do so, and the
willingness to cede some autonomy to a central planner. The need for methods for
implementing this truthful exchange is stressed.
Bid Price Sharing Control
In most revenue management systems, there exist estimated values of unsold seats,
which are loosely referred to as bid prices, but can take of the form of EMSRc values,
shadow prices, or prorated bid prices, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Under bid
price sharing (BPS) control, a code share itinerary is accepted if the fare exceeds the
sum of the bid prices (of the partners operating the various flight legs) on all the legs
traversed. A schematic of the BPS process is presented in Figure 2-10.
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It was proposed in Darot (2001) that airlines exchange either actual bid prices (if
they have the legal ability to do so), or to infer bid prices from the lowest available
fares, an idea re-iterated in Vinod (2004), in order to inform one another of the value
of seat inventory on code share flight legs. Bid price inference may be a feasible option
for airlines that do not have the antitrust immunity to share such information.
Booking Request
Partner 1:
Biprc Bidprices 
. Inventory Decision
CompuationControl
Bidprice sharing
Separate Optimization
Booking Request
Partner 2. 4t everv, R M
checkpoint Inventory Decision
Bidprices Contro
Figure 2-10: Illustration of Bid Price Sharing for Code Share Availability (Darot,
2001)
Jain showed that, when both partners use a version of DAVN, sharing bid (shadow)
prices from the previous optimization, dated by as much as one week, still produces
revenue gains of up to 0.27%. However, the results of BPS when the partners used
ProBP only provided revenue gains of up to .05%. These results were obtained in a
44-city hypothetical network where code share fares were very high relative to local
and connecting fares, with an average network load factor (LF) of 83%, where one
alliance competed with two other non-allied airlines, and where all four airlines were
located in the US with flight legs emanating toward the east and west. This thesis
continues to test BPS in the same and in a different network setting, exchanging cur-
rent (not dated) bid prices with more frequent optimization from that used by Jain,
with results presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
In his dissertation, Wright et al. (2010) offers another version of the alliance prob-
lem. He proposes a game of incomplete information, where the carriers ignore the
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second-order effects on the partner of selling own inventory (i.e., do not account
for opportunity costs to the partner of selling own local and connecting tickets in
their value function). In the incomplete information game, partners also exchange
bid prices for code share availability control. The small-scale simulations in Wright
et al. (2010) show that bid price control produces gains just as good as those of
the dynamic transfer price schemes in the cooperative game of complete information.
Wright's encouraging result indicates that the simpler BPS approach, which requires
much less computation than the dynamic programming approach with transfer prices
but produces similar revenues, may be a good solution to the alliance RM problem.
2.5.4 Revenue Resolution
Revenue resolution contracts typically require sharing revenue according to a prorated
fare approach (Vinod, 2005). The contracts are established before code share avail-
ability control is exercised, but the revenue exchange occurs after tickets have been
sold and money collected by the marketing carrier. IATA agreements require revenue
sharing according to a prorate based on mileage, weighted more heavily on short-
haul routes (which have a higher unit operating cost than long-haul routes). Such
contracts, based on a fixed proportion, are referred to as special prorate agreements
(SPAs) between two carriers, and they do not necessarily ensure that the operating
carrier receives an amount larger than his bid price or expected marginal revenue for
the seat that is sold. In a case where the operating carrier receives a transfer price
less than the estimated value of his seat inventory, he will not wish to give up the
seat for the benefit of the alliance.
Vinod (2004) extends bid price sharing beyond availability control, arguing that it
can be used to improve the fairness of revenue sharing, so that airlines are incentivized
to make better availability choices for the alliance. He proposes a dynamic proration
scheme that, like in bid price sharing control, accepts a code share booking if its fare
exceeds the sum of both partners' bid prices, and then pays the operating carrier at
least his bid price if the SPA does not provide an amount in excess of the bid price.
He admits that the implementation of this idea would be challenging, as airlines are
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still struggling with static proration and availability control of interline itineraries.
Neither does he address the issue of asymmetric bid prices calculated by different
means, which can result in very different bid price values. Vinod also discusses how
dynamic revenue sharing can be tracked through the passenger name record (PNR)
of a booking. At the event of each booking, the dynamic transfer price can be noted
in the PNR for later use in revenue resolution.
The availability and revenue from local and connecting bookings is also affected
by the presence of code share bookings, but this own local and connecting revenue is
not shared. For example, the idea that a carrier might include an opportunity cost
to his partner of selling own local and connecting itineraries does not make sense in
a non-cooperative game, because such an approach reduces the availability of own
inventory in favor of code shares. This presents an issue when determining a contract
for sharing revenues from code share bookings according to a pre-fixed amount. Un-
der such a contract, the aim will be to maximize revenue from local and connecting
bookings and reduce revenue from code shares, as argued by Darot (2001). It is likely
that the effect on airline behavior of this aspect of the non-cooperation game, where
players aim to maximize their own revenue, may not be negligible, necessitating very
careful negotiation of revenue sharing contracts.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, airline and alliance revenue management were reviewed. The concepts
of differential pricing and fare structures were explained. Methods tested in this thesis
for forecasting and unconstraining closed booking observations were presented. Leg-
and network-based revenue management methods used for determining seat allocation
tested in this thesis (EMSRb, HBP, DAVN, and ProBP) were compared.
The second part of the chapter focused on the challenges of alliance revenue man-
agement and revenue resolution. The steps of alliance revenue management, beginning
with the recording and forecasting of code share bookings, were described. It was ex-
plained that the valuation of code share bookings, which can be static or dynamic,
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may or may not correspond to the transfer price paid to the operating carrier for use
of its seat inventory. The determination of seat availability for code share itineraries
may be done in a decentralized manner, directly by the marketing partner, or using
BPS to better coordinate decisions by accounting for the total opportunity cost to
the alliance of using seat inventory. Lastly, revenue resolution among the alliance
partners was discussed.
Some of the alliance RM-related literature reviewed in this chapter presents inter-
esting ideas and novel approaches for the solution of the alliance revenue management
problem, but makes assumptions about the technical, legal, and cooperative environ-
ments of airline alliances that are currently untrue and unrealistic for the foreseeable
future. This thesis aims to present feasible solutions for alliance booking availability
control that can be implemented within the next few years given the current operating
conditions and technical capabilities of airlines.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
In this chapter, an overview of the experimental methodology used in the thesis is out-
lined. We first describe PODS, the software simulation tool used to test the various
alliance revenue management techniques. The inputs, passenger simulation, fore-
casting, and simulation properties are discussed. We then introduce the two PODS
alliance networks tested in this research: the US-based alliance network A4 and the
trans-Atlantic network E. The types of bid prices that can be exchanged among the
alliance airlines are compared in the context of bid price sharing (BPS). The mecha-
nism of BPS for code share availability control is defined for the revenue management
methods tested. Lastly, an example is provided to illustrate single versus dual airline
availability control for code share booking requests, and the timeliness of bid price
exchange is discussed.
3.1 Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator
The experiments in this thesis used a software simulation called The Passenger Origin-
Destination Simulator (PODS) to test the effects of sharing information among al-
liance partners. PODS was developed at The Boeing Company in 1997 by Hopper-
stad, Berge and Filipowski (Hopperstad, 2005). PODS comprises two underlying
models that represent the processes of passenger choice and airline revenue manage-
ment systems. An illustration of the PODS processes and the interaction of the two
comprising models is presented in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1: Illustration of PODS Processes, Adapted from Belobaba (2010)
The passengers are presented with itinerary choices made available for booking by
the airline revenue management systems, and the passenger decisions are recorded by
the RM systems' databases. Thus, the two basic models in PODS interact at the levels
of seat allocation and passenger choice/decision (Belobaba, 2010). PODS is the most
sophisticated competitive airline simulator tool known to the author. It has extensive
modeling capabilities, including passenger preference and decision making, compet-
itive interaction between airlines with overlapping networks, and different demand
forecasting methods and revenue management systems among the competing airlines.
3.1.1 Inputs to PODS
The user provides inputs to the simulator that are based on assumptions about pas-
senger characteristics in air transportation. The inputs include the proportions of
business and leisure passengers by O-D market, as well as the arrival rates of these
passengers during the booking process. For example, it is generally true that leisure
passengers arrive earlier in the booking process and have a lower willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for their tickets, a lower disutility associated with ticket restrictions, and less
sensitivity to timing of flight departure, arrival, and connecting itineraries. Busi-
ness passengers typically arrival later in the booking process and are more sensitive
to ticket restrictions and flight timing. Passengers who arrive later in the booking
process, on average, have a higher WTP, and capitalizing on this fact in the seat
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allocation decisions is often instrumental in improving revenues.
Inputs relating to the airlines and their revenue management systems include the
revenue management schemes used by airlines in the simulation, the number of fare
classes and the restrictions on each fare class, advance purchase requirements on each
fare class, and the fares associated with each O-D itinerary and fare class. Also, each
hypothetical PODS network includes a variety of cities served by each airline, depar-
ture times for scheduled flights between cities, and various aircraft sizes assigned to
each flight leg.
3.1.2 Simulation of Passengers
Passengers are generated according to the input business/leisure mix, with a maxi-
mum WTP that is modeled by a negative exponential distribution, thus capturing the
smaller proportion of passengers who are willing to pay 4 or 5 times the lowest existing
fare in the market (base fare). The simulated passengers have a desire to travel from
origin to destination with a preferred time window for their departure and arrival
times. Disutility costs for the average business or leisure passenger are obtained by
associating a monetary penalty with any fare restrictions (such as cancel or change
fees, or minimum stay requirements), connecting itineraries, unfavorite airlines, and
replanning (if no itinerary is feasible within the preferred time window and WTP).
These monetary costs are randomized according to Gaussian distributions to model
the stochasticity in passenger preference. The sum of these disutility costs is added to
the actual fare of an itinerary to obtain its total generalized cost, and the passenger
chooses the option with the lowest total cost. If there is no itinerary whose fare falls
below the passenger's maximum WTP threshold, then the passenger does not fly.
3.1.3 Forecasting of Future Demand
PODS also provides each airline with a forecaster that uses data from the airline's
historical database to forecast future demand by fare class at either the flight-leg or
itinerary level. Because the recorded bookings do not reflect actual demand by WTP
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or passenger type, but rather only contain the fare class in which the passenger was
booked, there will be a downward bias in the forecasts for the demand for the top fare
classes. Since passengers will book the cheapest fare available, the airline does not
observe their true WTP. If standard forecasting methods (such as pick-up) are used, as
described in Chapter 2, the forecaster will in turn forecast more demand for the lower
classes and less for top classes, and this phenomenon is is referred to as spiral down (for
more information, see Cleaz-Savoyen, 2005). It is commonly observed in PODS that
more aggressive forecasting and seat allocation methods (those that protect more seats
for top classes) result in better revenue performance because they mitigate the effects
of spiral down, particularly in less-restricted fare structures. We will see in Chapters
4 and 5 that aggressive seat protections may improve revenues, but this depends on
the competitive situation, demand, and passenger preferences faced by the airline.
3.1.4 Simulation Properties
The booking process is simulated over 63 days prior to flight departure, divided into
16 time frames (TFs). At user-specified time intervals (i.e., once per time frame or
each day) the booking limits (and bid prices, shadow prices, and EMSRc values, if
applicable) are re-calculated by each airline's revenue management system. How-
ever, fare classes may be closed within a TF if the maximum booking limit has been
reached. Each simulated airline has access to its own historical database only.
Each simulation trial consists of 600 samples, which each represent one day of
booking behavior. The first 200 samples are discarded to allow convergence to an
equilibrium state without the influence of initial conditions. The remaining 400 sam-
ples are then averaged to obtain the simulation trial output. Averaging the sample
results ensures small standard deviation of the results, which consist of reported rev-
enues, load factors, yields, fare class mix, and many other details for each airline. For
the tests of alliance scenarios, 2 trials were used per run. The software is currently
used by the PODS Research Consortium at MIT to test the effects of different revenue
management techniques on airlines.
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3.2 Alliance Networks Used in PODS
In this section, the two alliance networks used in the simulation for testing the effects
of BPS are described. The fundamental structure of the networks is different, and
thus it is expected that the results from bid price sharing will differ.
3.2.1 US-Based Network A4
A network structure and schedule of flights must be provided as input to PODS. For
the first part of the results section of this thesis (Chapter 4) we use PODS alliance
network A4, used in Jain (2011). Network A4 has 40 spoke cities, resulting in 444
flight legs and 572 O-D markets. The network has four competing airlines, all of
which have hubs based in the central area of the United States, with airlines 2 and 4
forming an alliance. Airline 1 competes with the alliance on all routes and represents
a strong network carrier. Airline 3 is a smaller airline that represents a low-cost car-
rier and competes in 296 markets with a cheaper and less restricted fare structure. In
addition to operating code share flights into each others' hubs, airline 2 serves four
international cities in the east and airline 4 serves six international cities in the west.
There is thus a natural asymmetry between the alliance airlines, which is the case in
reality and has not been represented in the OR literature on alliances. An illustration
of network A4 is provided in Figure 3-2 below.
In the baseline case, airlines 2 and 4 use EMSRb (leg-based RM control) for seat
allocation and standard availability control. In the results section, all reference to
changes from the baseline case refer to the scenario where the alliance airlines use
EMSRb with leg forecasting and local valuation of code share itineraries. Airline 1
uses DAVN with 8 virtual buckets and itinerary-specific forecasting. Airline 3 uses a
simple revenue management technique that does not require forecasting called Adap-
tive Threshold with a target load factor of 90%. A summary of the baseline case for
network A4 is provided in Table 3.1 below.
55
YV j 2
ANC
NRT
H
SFO
Figure 3-2: Illustration of Alliance Network A4 (airline 2 routes in orange, airline 4
routes in dark blue)
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Table 3.1: Summary of Baseline Case in Network A4, from Jain (2011)
3.2.2 Trans-Atlantic Network E
Network E represents two competing alliances, each with partner hubs across the At-
lantic. The two competing alliances have one set of partners (airlines 1 and 2) whose
hubs are located in the central United States, while the other two partners (airlines
3 and 4) have hubs located in Europe. Airlines 1 and 3 form alliance 1, and airlines 2
and 4 make up alliance 2. The spoke cities emanate from the continental hubs, with
10 in the northern part and 10 in the southern part of Europe, as well as 10 in the
western part and 10 in the eastern part of the United States. In the baseline case for
network E, all airlines use EMSRb with leg forecasting.
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Roughly speaking, network E has a dumbbell structure, as compared to network
A4's butterfly structure. The hub-to-hub trunk routes (served by large aircraft) carry
a large amount of passengers across the Atlantic into the hubs and feed the smaller
hub-to-spoke routes (served by small aircraft). Such trunk flights occur three times
a day, providing connecting opportunities during three banks. The routes are served
by each airline, resulting in a total of six hub-to-hub flights and 12 additional trans-
Atlantic flights per bank. In addition, some local and connecting traffic does not
cross the Atlantic, but traverses spoke-to-hub and hub-to-spoke routes, staying on
the same continent. Also, there are hub-bypass routes crossing the Atlantic that go
from a continental hub to a major city on the other continent, without requiring a
connection at the partner hub.
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Figure 3-3: Schematic of Network E
3.3 Types of Bid Prices
In Chapter 2, the idea of bid price sharing was introduced from the prior literature
on alliance revenue management for controlling code share availability. Several ways
of estimating the value of unused flight leg seat inventory, which we loosely refer to as
"bid prices", were presented in the context of the revenue management methods that
produce them. These included the prorated bid prices of the ProBP algorithm, the
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shadow prices of DAVN, and the critical expected marginal seat revenues (EMSRc)
of the EMSR heuristic. In this section, we compare the calculation, values, strengths,
and weaknesses of these bid prices.
When an alliance partner uses ProBP, the value that represents the opportunity
costs of selling a seat on a flight leg is the prorated bid price calculated by the ProBP
algorithm. As discussed in Chapter 2, the values represent a prorated portion of ex-
pected marginal seat revenues that have been calculated iteratively, after accounting
for the forecasted demand for all possible connecting itineraries that could use a seat
on all flight legs in the airline's own network. The airline ships the ProBP bid price
as its estimate of the value of a seat on a code share leg. However, this value may
not be the best representation of the value of the seat on the code share flight leg
to the combined alliance network because the calculation was performed without the
ProBP algorithm's access to the partner's information during the optimization.
With DAVN, the dual solution to a network linear program (subject to capacity
constraints and deterministic demand forecasts) produces shadow prices for each leg
of an airline's own network. These shadow prices represent a network displacement
cost and are used to adjust for the displacement of local passengers on connecting
itineraries. Because these values are shadow prices and represent a penalty for vio-
lating the capacity constraint on a flight leg, these values are zero if the forecasted
demand is below the capacity. The problem with using shadow prices from determin-
istic demand forecasts is that they do not account for the probability that demand
takes a value larger or smaller than the mean forecast, and in that case, the capacity
constraint may or may not be violated. A single shadow price does not reflect this
probability.
Another alternative for DAVN airlines is to ship the critical EMSR value for a
flight leg, which represents the estimated value of the last available seat given remain-
ing capacity, based on virtual bucket demand forecasts. These values are higher than
shadow prices on average because they account for the probability that demand will
be higher than the mean forecast and are especially high later in the booking period
when high WTP passengers are expected to arrive into the booking process.
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For a visual representation of how these bid prices change over the course of the
booking process, the average values of the three types of bid prices from scenarios in
network A4, where the alliance airlines both used either ProBP or DAVN as their RM
methods, are graphed by time frame in Figure 3-4 below. We can see that the average
ProBP bid prices are higher throughout the booking process than are DAVN network
shadow prices, and that EMSRc values are highest of all throughout, gaining espe-
cially in the later time frames, as the remaining capacity decreases. Average shadow
prices are lowest because of the presence of many zero values for flights whose average
demand forecast is below capacity. Their values also peak in later time frames and
fall very quickly at the end as demand for some flights does not materialize, and the
number of flights with demand forecasted to exceed capacity diminishes.
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Figure 3-4: Graph of Average ProBP Bid Prices, DAVN Shadow Prices, and EMSRc
Values by Time Frame
3.4 BPS for Availability Control
BPS, introduced in Chapter 2, is the mechanism of alliance partners sharing op-
portunity costs or network displacement costs of unsold seats on their flight legs to
better inform code share availability decisions. Using the definitions in Jain (2011)
for consistency with that work, the total code share O-D fare, FCs, less the the most
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recently received alliance partner's bid price P-;, lagged by one time frame or day
(or some amount of time lag), must exceed or equal the bid price (or seat value) on
the operating partner's flight PL,, as follows:
Fcs - P - Pan (3.1)
The important thing to note with regard to BPS is that the bid prices are cal-
culated independently by each partner, using only the information in that partner's
historical database. Partners do not have access to each others' booking databases,
forecasts, or optimizers. Also, note that since each partner runs his optimization
software separately, booking limits on local and connecting itineraries are established
prior to BPS. This can produce sub-optimal booking protections on local and con-
necting itineraries as well as code shares because the optimization did not use all
the available information when determining local and connecting protections. Bid
prices are then sent to the partner after this separate optimization, and code share
acceptance policies are applied in the last step of alliance revenue management (code
share availability control), as illustrated in Figure 2-8 of Chapter 2.
3.4.1 ProBP
When the alliance partners use ProBP, the bid price sharing is simple, and works
just like availability control of connecting itineraries in ProBP. The partner's most
recent shipped bid price (a small lag in the timing of shipment is indicated by t - 1)
represents his estimated value of the marginal seat of inventory on his flight leg. The
marketing partner (or own airline) has access to its most recently calculated bid price,
indicated by t. In order for the code share itinerary to be made available for booking,
the code share fare, FCs, must exceed the sum of the own bid price on the marketing
carrier's affected flight leg and the partner's affected flight leg, as in equation 3.2
Fcs BP,, + BP, 1 (3.2)
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3.4.2 DAVN with Shadow Price Exchange
When the partners use DAVN and exchange shadow prices, equation 3.2 must be
modified. The bid price shipped by the partner is now the shadow price, SPpa.,
from the dual solution of the network LP in DAVN. Recall that these shadow prices
will frequently be zeros if the forecasted demand for the flight leg is below capacity.
The "bid price" used by the marketing partner is Bt, the minimum range of the
lowest currently open DAVN virtual bucket for the code share flight leg, instead of
the prorated ProBP bid price.
Fcs ;> B in + SP;ar (3.3)
Note that if the operating partner's shipped shadow price is zero, this will result in
a code share itinerary being made available if the total fare falls into an open virtual
bucket on the marketing partner's affected flight leg.
3.4.3 DAVN with EMSRc Value Exchange
Another alternative for a value to use in BPS among DAVN partners is to ship own
EMSRc values from the virtual buckets for the seats on flights involved in code share
itineraries. Note that EMSRc values are higher than shadow prices, because they are
less likely to be zero as are the shadow prices from the deterministic LP dual solution.
Thus, using EMSRc values as bid prices will typically be more restrictive for code
share availability, as it requires that the code share fare be higher in order to satisfy
the BPS equation.
Fcs ;> Bin + EMS Rct- (3.4)
A comparison of the acceptance criteria for ProBP versus DAVN BPS scenarios
is provided in Figure 3-5 below.
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DAVN:
- Does the ODF minus current partner bid
price fall into an open bucket on the
marketing carrier's flight leg?
- If yes, accept the CS booking
Buckets
1
2
34
X ODF - BP,, '> Bucket,
ProBP:
- Does the ODF exceed the sum of the
marketing and operating partners'
current bid prices?
- If yes, accept the CS booking
ODFd,,ar, B ,,' + BPa-t,
Note that this equation is
identical for both partners IF
(1) both useProB3P, andg
bid prices simultaneously
Figure 3-5: Bid Price Sharing for Code Share Availability in ProBP and DAVN
3.4.4 HBP and EMSRb
When using HBP or EMSRb, which are leg RM methods, as described in Chapter
2, a partner only has EMSR values for all of its flight legs. By default, this becomes
the bid price that is shipped. For code share availability control with BPS, the HBP
partner uses the HBP equation, simply using the bid price received from his partner
as the second bid price value. Of the two opportunity costs in his possession, his own
EMSR value and partner's shipped bid price, the lower value is multiplied by the dis-
placement factor, d, to account for the probability of displacing two local passengers
on the code share itinerary. The displacement factor used in the experiments in this
thesis is .25, assuming a .50 change of displacing a local passenger on either flight leg.
The availability control equation is thus:
Fcs > Max(EMSRt , P-) + d * Min(EMSR o, P-') (3.5)
With EMSRb, the availability control is on the leg level, so it is not possible for a
partner to perform any code share availability control separate from the leg level. The
leg protections for code share itineraries will have been determined during the seat
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allocation step, and the only way to modify the resulting protections is though either
changing the valuation associated with code shares (which is set to local valuation in
this thesis), or by modifying the forecasts. However, bid price sharing is still possible
when an EMSRb partner is involved, as long as the other partner uses some form of
O-D control. The EMSRb partner would ship the EMSR values for his flight legs,
and the O-D partner will use those values as bid prices for code share control.
3.5 Examples of Code Share Availability Control
In dual availability control, both of the partners' availability control equations must
be satisfied. In single availability control, the partners ship each other their respective
bid prices as before, but only the marketing carrier is responsible for making the avail-
ability decision. Therefore, when a booking request is being made, only one airline
must process the availability control equation and produce a decision, and the infor-
mation technology burden is greatly reduced. However, single control can produce
asymmetric sales of code share itineraries if the sets of bid prices used in availability
decisions by each partner differ. The more dated the exchanged bid prices are, the
more the sets of bid prices used to satisfy the above equations may differ. If both part-
ner use ProBP and exchange bid prices at the same time, the acceptance equations
will be identical. A summary of the acceptance criteria for code share booking control
using single or dual control and ProBP or DAVN is provided in Table 3.2 below.
3.5.1 Standard Code Share Availability Control Example
An example of code share availability control is provided now, as it occurs in the
three possibilities of: 1) during the seat allocation step (assuming the partners have
the right to free sale as long as the fare class is open on the partner's flight leg), 2)
BPS with single airline availability control, and 3) BPS with dual availability control.
Suppose both airlines use ProBP bid price control as their optimization method
to determine seat protections. Airline 1 has calculated its leg 1 bid prices to be as
follows. The last calculation shipped to airline 2 was PA = 150, and the current
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Accept/reject criteria for code share itineraries
Single Control Dual Control
ODF Available on Marketinig ODF ALSO Available on
Partner [rnkt). Operating:Partner [op]
Table 3.2: Single or Dual Code Share Availability Control with ProBP and DAVN
bid price for own use is PAi = 190. Airline 2 has calculated its leg 2 bid prices to be
as follows. The last calculation shipped to airline 1 wasP = 120, and the current
bid price for own use is PA2 = 140. Therefore, the total bid price sums used for code
share availability control with bid price sharing are:
Airline 1 : Pi = 140 + t - 1 A2 = 190 + 120 = 310 (3.6)
Airline 2 :PA2 = 140 + t - lA1 = 140 + 150 = 290 (3.7)
If the airlines do not use bid price sharing as a post-fact control method for code
share availability, then the results from the seat allocation step are the default avail-
abilities from the RM optimizer. In the example illustrated below, leg 2 in class 4
is not available (operated by airline 2) because the local fare (100) is less than the
current bid price (140). In order for a code share itinerary to be available for sale,
both legs must be available on each airline partner. Thus, in this example, the code
share path is not available for sale by either airline (even though leg 1 in class 4 is
available on airline 1).
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Airline 1
Current BP= 190
Airline 2
Current BP= 140
Availability
4 n!
Figure 3-6: Illustration of Code Share Availability Control without Bid Price Sharing
3.5.2 BPS Dual Availability Control Example
When the airlines use dual availability control with bid price sharing, the decision
fare is no longer the local fare, but rather the total code share fare (in this case, 300).
For airline 1, the sum of the bid prices for class 4 (310) is greater than decision fare
(300) for the code share path traversing leg 1, so code share leg 1 is not available.
However, on airline 2, the bid price (290) is less than the decision fare (300), and code
share leg 2 is available on airline 2. However, because dual control requires that both
partners have the itinerary available, neither airline sells the code share itinerary.
Airline 1
Sum of BP=310
4 "-A3
Airline 2
Sum of BP=290
Availability
4 no
pah2class dfare avail? 4
(sold by4 .
Fc2) 4 4i no
Figure 3-7: Bid Price Sharing with Dual Partner Code Share Availability Control
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Path 1
(sold by
AL1)
Paths 2f aal class df are avail
(sold by
AL2) I * I
Path 1
(sold by
AL)
3.5.3 BPS Single Availability Control Example
With single availability control, the alliance partner may sell the itinerary as long as
it is available according to the partner's own calculations. It is not required that the
specific code share itinerary also be available on the partner airline. As before, for
airline 1, the sum of the bid prices for class 4 (310) is greater than the decision fare
(300) for the code share path, so the code share path is not sold by airline 1 However,
on airline 2, the bid price sum (290) is less than code share fare (300). Unlike in
dual control, however, the code share path is in fact sold by airline 2. Thus, single
control results in more code share bookings sold than dual control, producing less
strict control decisions and resulting in less aggressive revenue management.
Airline 1 Airline 2 Availability
Sum of BP=310 Sum of BP=290
Path 1
(sold by
Path 2 e_111,- ass vae
(sold by -3 yes,,,
AL2) ] 4 yes
Figure 3-8: Bid Price Sharing with Single Partner Code Share Availability Control
3.6 Timeliness of Bid Price Exchange
In the equation 3.1, the partner's bid price is dated (it is from the prior time frame).
The network displacement costs that are represented by the bid prices will be more
accurate if the information is from the current time frame (or as recent as possible),
and we expect that the revenue benefits to the alliance will be greater. However,
sharing information in the current time frame requires more advanced RM system
and communication technology on the part of the alliance members, and there exists
a range of capabilities among airlines today, with some near real-time communica-
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tion in place among parent airlines and their subsidiaries, and more rudimentary
communication between other alliance partners.
Note that when ProBP is used and bid prices are exchanged and recalculated at
the start of each day, which was tested and verified in the experiments in this thesis,
the resulting availability control decisions with single and dual availability control are
identical. This is because both partners' equations are identical when the bid prices
each partner uses are identical.
3.7 Summary
This chapter described the methodology to be used in the thesis experiments. First,
PODS was described, along with the inputs to the underlying models, simulation of
passengers and simulation properties. Then, the two alliance networks used in the the-
sis experiments were presented. The types of bid prices available for exchange in BPS
for code share availability control were compared and contrasted. Finally, BPS with
single versus dual availability control was explained, and an example was provided.
In the following chapters, the results of tests on the performance of BPS with
single and dual airline control with local valuation of code share paths, and dynamic
valuation (explained in Chapter 2) of code share paths, are presented for various
optimization frequency, load factor, RM method, and network scenarios. Chapter 4
continues the work of Jain (2011), presenting the results in network A4 of exchanging
current bid prices, at 83% load factor, with two optimization frequencies and a vari-
ety of network and leg RM combinations for the alliance airlines. Chapter 5 presents
the results in network E at 83% and 86% load factors, and two optimization frequen-
cies, for each of the two competing alliances when both partners in an alliance use
ProBP and DAVN. Chapter 6 presents the overall conclusions, discusses implications
for airlines, and proposes areas for future research.
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Chapter 4
Results in Network A4
In this chapter, an analysis of the results in the US-based PODS alliance network A4
(introduced in Chapter 3) is presented. First, some assumptions and methodological
details are clarified. Details regarding the baseline case, where the two alliance airlines
use EMSRb as their RM method, are then presented and discussed in the context of
the network characteristics and their effect on code share traffic. The results when
the alliance partners use ProBP, and then DAVN, with optimization occurring at the
start of each of 16 times frames, as compared to daily, are presented. The performance
of bid price sharing (BPS) and dynamic valuation (DV) in each of these network RM
and optimization frequency scenarios is then analyzed. The last section of the chapter
provides a summary of the results obtained when the alliance partners use various
(symmetric and asymmetric) combinations of network and leg RM methods.
This chapter serves as a continuation of the work of Jain (2011) on BPS and DV
in PODS alliance network A4. In particular, this chapter addresses several unan-
swered questions from the prior findings and revises several of the methodological
assumptions in Jain (2011).
First, we modify the assumption that there is a time lag (of one time frame) in the
exchange of bid prices among alliance partners. In the results of this thesis, all bid
prices that are exchanged are the most current values, obtained from the most recent
optimization of alliance partners, and available for use immediately by the receiving
partner.
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Second, we perform experiments to test the performance of BPS and DV as a
function of the optimization frequency (and thus, the accuracy) of the bid prices re-
ceived. The performance of network RM, as a function of bid prices (prorated EMSRc
values in ProBP, and LP shadow prices in DAVN) and virtual bucket booking limits
(calculated via EMSRb in DAVN), is affected by optimization frequency. In alliances,
BPS and DV are further affected if dated (less accurate) bid prices are used.
In Jain (2011), the optimization frequency for DAVN was at the start of each of 16
times frames, and once every 200 bookings for ProBP. In the first two sections of this
chapter, we will examine how BPS and DV in alliance network A4 react to optimiza-
tion that occurs daily versus at the start of each of 16 time frames when the two al-
liance partners both use ProBP or DAVN. All results will be compared with the base-
line case of the alliance airlines using EMSRb, and local valuation of code share paths.
Third, we use a different implementation of BPS in DAVN, which produces very
different results for DAVN than observed in Jain (2011). In that work, the total code
share fare, Fcs, must exceed the sum of the marketing partner's EMSRc value on
its code share flight leg, EMSRc.,, and the partner's bid price from the prior time
frame, BP-, as follows: Fcs > EMSRct + BP;..
This thesis's DAVN BPS implementation uses a bucketing criterion rather than an
EMSRc criterion, meaning that the total code share fare minus the partner's current
bid price must exceed the marketing partner's minimum open bucket value, Bm,
on the code share flight leg. Presented in the same equation format as the EMSRc
criterion used in Jain (2011), the criterion is as follows: Fcs ;> Bt + BPr. The
EMSRc criterion performs better because it is more aggressive, requiring that code
share fares be higher in order to pass the acceptance criteria. However, bucketing is
more consistent with DAVN treatment of own connecting itineraries.
Fourth, the DAVN BPS implementation in Jain (2011) also affected the avail-
ability of local and connecting itineraries. Rather than using local valuation of code
shares during the determination of virtual bucket booking limits, Fcs - BPpart was
used as the valuation in calculating the virtual bucket booking limits according to
EMSRb. This resulted in a larger demand forecast for the higher value virtual buck-
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ets, and therefore caused stricter booking limits on the lower virtual buckets. The
result was a better overall performance of DAVN in local, connecting, and code share
traffic components. Some of the positive effects of DV were achieved by this BPS im-
plementation. However, such an implementation removes the separation between the
optimization step (performed separately by each airline, before bid price exchange)
and the post-fact code share availability determination, which is the intention of BPS.
In this thesis, we use local valuation of code shares for the determination of virtual
bucket booking limits according to EMSRb.
Lastly, we also test BPS with single airline code share availability control, whereas
all results in Jain (2011) referencing BPS used dual airline code share control. Chap-
ter 3 provided a detailed example of the difference between BPS with single and dual
availability control.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the important characteristics of the four airlines
in alliance network A4 in the baseline case, including load factors, revenues, and traf-
fic details, which will be useful later in understanding the results of BPS and DV in
the network E experiments as well. Note that traffic (passengers carried) percentages
include both own and partner code share passengers for each alliance airline, because
code share passengers occupy seats on both airlines' flight legs. It is immediately
clear that the code share passengers provide a high proportion of revenues relative to
their proportion of traffic.
Airline- % Load Revenue % % % Code Passengers % % % Code
RM Factor (000s) Local Connecting Share Carried Local Connecting Share
1-DAVN 83.9 3413 28 72 - 8656 46 54 -
2-EMSRb 81.3 2117 32 39 28 6505 49 35 16
A 78.3 6 0 40 - 55161 63 37
4-EMSRb 83.9 2562 26 51 23 7159 38 47 15
Table 4.1: Baseline Characteristics of Network A4 by Airline
Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of the percentages of revenues and bookings gen-
erated by the three components, local, connecting, and code share, for the alliance as
a whole in the baseline case when the alliance airlines both use EMRSb. Note that,
in Table 4.2's presentation of alliance characteristics, code share booking percentages
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are only 8.4% because code share passengers are only counted once per itinerary,
whereas in Table 4.1, code share passengers were counted twice, once per alliance
partner. It is especially clear what an important revenue source the code share traffic
is in network A4, since the average code share fare is nearly five times the average
local fare and about three times the average connecting fare.
% Bookings % Revenue Average Fare
Local 46.5 29.1 215
Connecting 45.1 45.7 347
Code Share 8.4 25.2 1022
Table 4.2: Total Alliance Baseline Revenue and Traffic Components
Now that we have introduced the chapter and presented some key aspects of net-
work A4, we proceed to the results in ProBP, followed by DAVN. In the last section
of the chapter, a summary table with results from different, asymmetric combinations
of ProBP, DAVN, HBP and EMSRb for the two alliance airlines will be presented to
obtain an overall picture of the performance of BPS and DV with various possible
RM combinations among the alliance partners. The experimental results presented
in the summary table will show results corresponding to TF optimization for DAVN
and EMSRb, and optimization every 200 bookings for ProBP and HBP, to remain
consistent with the results in Jain (2011). The end of the chapter presents conclusions
regarding the results obtained in network A4.
4.1 ProBP
In this section, we present and discuss the results for the case where both airlines
in the alliance use ProBP. Figure 4-1 shows the percent revenue gains over baseline
obtained by the alliance when it uses ProBP, and additionally BPS or DV. The fig-
ure is divided into three groupings, with the first showing the results if optimization
occurs at the start of each of 16 time frames, the second showing the results from
optimization every 200 bookings, and the third, optimization at the start of each day.
The middle grouping corresponds to the ProBP results found in Jain (2011). There
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is no distinction for BPS with single or dual availability control with ProBP because
the simultaneous calculation and exchange of bid prices results in identical ProBP
equations for code share acceptance criteria among both partners, thus producing the
same results. Note that all figures show the total alliance changes (for both airlines
taken together) from the baseline case where both alliance partners use EMSRb.
% Revenue Changes
TF Optimization 200 Bookings Daily Opt'zation
1.01
0.85 0.77 0.8
* ProBP 0.57 0.610.67
* ProBP + BPS 0.33 0.35
ProBP + DV
LFs: 82.6 +.1 +.1 82.7 +.1 +.1 82.7 +.1 +.1
Figure 4-1: ProBP: Alliance Percent Change in Revenues over Baseline
Optimizing daily, rather than once each time frame (i.e., 4 times as often), results
in large revenue gains of +.44%. The results shown here are consistent with the re-
sults of Jain (2011), in that when using ProBP, BPS gains minimally (up to .05%),
and DV gains significantly (up to .24%). This result remains true regardless of the
frequency of optimization. Figure 4-2 shows that the improvements in revenues from
daily optimization are highest for the connections component. Daily optimization cre-
ates revenue gains in all traffic components by similar amounts for no BPS, BPS and
DV. This indicates that the revenue improvements obtained from daily optimization
are similar regardless of the alliance RM technique, whether BPS or DV. However,
the revenue increase in the code share component, due to switching to daily optimiza-
tion, is highest for BPS. Unlike BPS, DV has an indirect affect on other itineraries
by increasing the bid prices on legs with heavy code share traffic, thereby displacing
more connecting traffic than BPS, and thus earning less revenue in that component.
In Figure 4-2, we see that BPS results in gains in the code share revenues, but
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causes large falls in connecting, and marginal declines in the local revenues. On the
other hand, DV generates even larger increases in code share revenues than BPS,
as well as marginal gains in local revenues, thus offsetting the declines it causes in
connecting revenues. DV causes the greatest losses in connecting revenues and traf-
fic, though this traffic is not fully regained in local and code share components. The
overall result is that the code share and local revenue gains of DV more than make up
for the losses in connecting revenues, producing a +.24% increase in overall alliance
revenues from ProBP with DV for all the optimization frequencies.
TF Optimization Daily Optimization
Local Conx CS Local Conx CS
SProBP 30
m ProBP+BPS
22 21
*ProBP + DV 21
16
2 10 11
-4
Figure 4-2: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Revenues (000s)
Figure 4-3 shows that average bid prices decrease with daily optimization. De-
spite fewer bookings with DV, it actually raises bid prices because code share fares
are very high value in network A4 relative to average fares for locals and connecting
itineraries. The other two methods, no BPS and BPS, use local valuation of code
share itineraries in the optimizer, which would shift bid prices downward. Looking
at Table 4.3, there occurs an increase in average fares from daily optimization in
all components, particularly in code shares (up to $5) and about $1 in locals and
connections. DV and BPS both cause large increases in average code share fares.
However, BPS also produces decreases in average connecting fares (and a small local
fare increase as well) because of the decline in bid prices, which allows more own local
and connecting bookings to be accepted at lower fares.
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Airline 2 Averaae Bid Prices
60 -
55 --- -.
50 - --...--
45 -
40
35
30 - TF opt/No BPS -Daily/No BPS
-TF opt/BPS - -Daily/BPS
25 - TF opt/DV *Daily/DV
20 1
TF: 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figure 4-3: Airline 2 Average Bid Prices by Time Frame
TF Optimization Daily Optimization
NoBPS BPS DV No BPS BPS DV
A in Total Bookings -35 -36 -52 -25 -24 -36
Average Fares Average Fares
Local ---- 213------ --- 214------
Connecting 354 353 354 355 ---354--
Code Share 1033 1046 1050 1038 1049 1052
Table 4.3: Change in Total Alliance Passengers (Compared to the Baseline Case
Where Alliance Airlines use EMSRb) and Average Alliance Component Fares
Table 4.4 presents a detailed summary of the changes in local, connecting and code
share component revenues, bookings, and average fares from the baseline case. Daily
optimization (the three bottom shaded rows) accepts fewer local and more connect-
ing bookings than TF optimization. Average bid prices are presented in Figure 4-3.
Lower bid prices on some itineraries allow more connecting bookings to occur. DV, in
turn, raises bid prices and reduces the number of connections to a large extent, a result
that is not true for BPS. In fact, while more local, and the same number of connecting
bookings are accepted using BPS, the revenues decline, as do the average fares.
The sizable decline in connecting revenues, but not a decline in passengers with
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Optimization Locals
Change in Frequency No BPS BPS DV
Revenues (OOOs) TF 2 1 5
Daily 6 5 8
Bookings TF 51 57 60
Daily 43 47 48.
Average Fares TF
Dailv
-1 -2 -1
-1 -1 0
Connections Code Share
No BPS BPS,:DV No BPS, BPS DV
18
30
-70
-50
11
22
-71
6
18
-97
-71
7 6 7
8 7 7
-4 4 16
0 11 21
-16 -23 -15
-18 -19 -13
11 24 27
16 27 30
Table 4.4: Summary Table of Changes in
Component Revenues, Bookings, and Average
Local, Connecting and Code Share
Fares from Baseline
BPS, is in contrast to the decline in connecting revenues from DV that is accompa-
nied by a decline in passengers, thus allowing more code share and local bookings. In
addition, the code share revenues are not as high for BPS as for DV, but the number
of code share passengers with BPS declines only slightly.
100 Locals Connections Code Shares
90 TF Opt Daily
No BPS -No BPS
80
--- BPS 
--- BPS
70 7 - *DV 
----- DV
60 -
50
40
30
2 0 -.. -....
10 .
0.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 4-4: Airline 2 Local, Connecting, and Code Share Class 6 Closer Rates
Figure 4-4 shows the aggregate average closure rates of the lowest class (class
6) of airline 2 for the local, connecting, and code share traffic components. Daily
optimization raises closure rates throughout the booking process for locals. For the
connections and code share components, rates are lower in earlier TFs and then rise
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later on. Code share closure rates are much lower in early time frames with daily than
TF optimization. Holding optimization frequency constant, there are nearly identical
code share closure rates for code shares with BPS and DV, except that DV closures
are marginally lower in early TFs and rise slightly above BPS in later time frames.
This results in a large rise in code share revenues amid a small decline in code share
passengers for DV. At the same time, revenues improve in the local component as well.
In general, the improvements of daily optimization occur due to higher closure
rates in later time frames of all traffic components. DV raises bid prices on routes
with heavy code share traffic, thereby generating slightly higher closure rates than
BPS in all components.
4.2 DAVN
This section presents and discusses the results for the case where both alliance airlines
use DAVN. Figure 4-5 presents the percent revenue gains over the baseline case (where
both alliance airlines use EMSRb) obtained by the alliance when it uses DAVN, and
additionally BPS (with single or dual airline availability control) or DV. The figure
is divided into two sections, one for shadow price (SP) exchange, and the second
for EMSRc value exchange, among the partners. There are two groupings in each
section, the first showing the results if optimization occurs at the start of each of 16
time frames, the second showing the results from optimization at the start of each
day. The first grouping in the first section corresponds to the results for DAVN in
Jain (2011) (only the results for no BPS and DV). As mentioned at the start of the
chapter, the implementation of BPS with DAVN differs in this thesis. The figure also
presents an additional column for the results of BPS with single airline control, which
was not present for ProBP.
The results indicate that DAVN is more robust than ProBP with less frequent
optimization. Gains from TF optimization over baseline start out higher (+.57%)
than the gains of ProBP (+.33%), but moving to daily optimization further improves
revenues by +.22%., which is just half of the ProBP gain. As in ProBP the case, the
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SP Sharing % Revenue Changes EMSRc Sharing % Revenue Changes
TF Optimization Daily Opt'zation' TF Optimization Daily Opt'zation'
* DAVN 1.08 1.08
0.87 0.84 0.85 0.85
EDAVN +
BPS/single 0 I.69
0.7 60 0.7 0.61
U DAVN + -47
BPS/dual
SDAVN + DV:
LFs: 83.0 +.2 +.1 +.1 82.9 +.2 +.1 +.1 +.2 +.0 +.1 +.2 +.1 +.1
Figure 4-5: DAVN: Alliance Percent Change in Revenues over Baseline, and Load
Factor Point Changes from Standard DAVN
additional gains from BPS and DV are consistent for each optimization frequency.
Below the bars that show revenue gains are the network load factors for each network
RM scenario without BPS, and the load factor point increase from applying BPS and
DV. We can see that the load factors increase slightly for all BPS and DV scenarios,
with the largest rise in load factors from BPS with single control, indicating that
more miles are being flown by passengers in that scenario.
Of note is that the exchange of SPs or EMSRc values has little effect on the rev-
enues. The revenue gains are slightly higher from EMSRc exchange and BPS with
single control because EMSRc values tend to be higher, on average, than SPs. Thus,
using EMSRc values as bid prices would result in a slightly stricter acceptance criteria
(requiring the code share fare to be higher in order to accept the booking). However,
this effect disappears if using BPS with dual control or DV. These results indicate
that it is more important to exchange some form of bid prices, as long as they contain
information about the value of a marginal seat on a flight leg, and that the specific
form of the bid price is less important. For the subsequently presented data in this
section, we focus on the SP exchange results.
Figure 4-6 shows that daily optimization (with SP exchange) creates revenue gains
in all traffic components by similar amounts for no BPS, BPS and DV, as was true for
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TF Optimization Daily Optimization
Local Conx CS Local Conx CS
33
*DAVN 30
26
*DAVN+ 22 23 23
BPS/single 22 21 21 2
*DAVN+ 17
BPS/dual 11
* DAVN + DV 9
6 5 4 5 4
2 2 1 0 0
-3 -5
Figure 4-6: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Revenues (000s)
ProBP. However, the gains are to a lesser degree than in ProBP, with the largest im-
provement due to daily optimization being in the code share and not the connecting
segment (as was for ProBP). DV creates very high code share revenue gains in both
cases, and BPS gains in the code share segment are similar for single and dual control
(just slightly higher for single control). However, the difference in revenues between
single and dual control is pronounced in the local and connecting components, where
dual control performs consistently better than single control, and better than DV by
a lesser margin. This trade off indicated that BPS with single control is accepting
too many code share passengers at the expense of local and connecting passengers,
with the modest code share revenue gains insufficient to make up for losses in local
and connecting revenues.
Like for ProBP, Figure 4-7 shows that, although average shadow prices are about
the same in early TFs, they decrease in later TFs with daily optimization. This re-
sults in the placement of more connecting fares into high-value virtual buckets, thus
improving protections for the high fare bookings by closing down more low-revenue
virtual value buckets. Additionally, we can see that DV causes decreases in the av-
erage shadow prices because total bookings decrease. With fewer flights predicted
to exceed capacity, the deterministic LP produces more zero shadow prices, bring-
ing down the average, additionally placing code share fares into high-value virtual
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buckets, and further increasing booking limits on low-value virtual buckets.
50 -Airline 2 Average Shadow Prices
45
40 -
35 -
30
20
15 ~ -TF opt, No BPS -Daily, No BPS
10 - - -TF opt, BPS/single - -Daily, BPS/single
5 - TF opt, BPS/dual --- Daily, 
BPS/dual
TF opt, DV "-- Daily, DV
0 TF: 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figure 4-7: Airline 2 Average Shadow Prices by Time Frame
TF Optimization Daily Optimization
No BPS BPS/single BPS/dual DV No BPS BPS/single BPS/dual DV
A in Total Bookings -7 2 -5 -24 -7 2 -3 -26
Average Alliance Fares Average Alliance Fares
Local 216 215 ----216---- 216 215 ----216----
Connecting 351 - 350------ ----352---- ----351----
Code Share 1023 989 1021 1031 1025 998 1027 1036
Table 4.5: Change in Total Alliance Passengers (Compared to the Baseline Case
Where Alliance Airlines use EMSRb) and Average Alliance Component Fares
Table 4.5 shows that increases in average fares occur from daily optimization (±$1-
2) in connecting and code share components without the use of BPS or DV. If BPS
and DV are in use, switching to daily optimization increases the average code share
fares by $5-9. Compared to no BPS, very large falls in average code share fares occur
with BPS/single control, but there occur large rises in code share fares with DV. This
indicates that BPS with single control accepts too many code share bookings at low
fares than do any of the other methods, whereas DV results in more high-fare code
share bookings.
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Table 4.6 presents a summary of the changes in local, connecting and code share
component revenues, bookings, and average fares from the baseline case. Daily op-
timization reduces the number of connecting bookings, but takes more locals (the
opposite of the results for ProBP). Though daily optimization takes a few more code
shares than TF optimization, applying BPS and DV reverses the effect and causes
fewer code share bookings than TF optimization.
Locals Connections Code Share
Optirnization BPS/ BPS/ BPS/ BPS/ No BPS/ BPS/
Change in Frequency No BPS single dual DV No BPS single dual DV BPS single dual DV
Revenues
(000s) TF 2 -3 2 1 30 17 22 19 -5 6 5 21
Daily 4 05 4 33 2126 23 0 11 9 23
Bookings TF -25 -34 -21 -39 24 -9 10 4 -6 45 6 11
Daily -12 -20 -9 -26 8 -17 3 -6 -3 39 3 7
Average Fares TF 1 1 1 2 4 3 3 3 1 -33 -1 9
Daily 1 1 1 2 5 4 4 4 3 -24 5 14
Table 4.6: Summary Table of Changes in Local, Connecting and Code Share
Component Revenues, Bookings, and Average Fares from Baseline
Looking at Figure 4-8, holding frequency of optimization constant, BPS with dual
control and DV still result in very similar closure rates for code shares. The pattern
of code share closure rates is the same for TF and daily optimization, only differing
a little in magnitude, with daily optimization resulting in slightly lower closure rates.
As expected, standard DAVN (no BPS) produces much higher closure rates than BPS
or DV in the code share component. BPS with single control accepts more low fare
passengers because it produces the lowest closure rates of any method, especially for
code shares and connections in early TFs. DV produces marginally higher closure
rates than BPS in all components, wherein lies its benefit.
We can see that, while code share and connecting closure rates change slightly
with optimization frequency, local closure rates are the same at each optimization
frequency, and rise with DV in each case, allowing room for code shares. Neither the
optimization frequency nor BPS have an effect on local closure rates because local
valuation is not affected by the calculated shadow prices, and BPS does not affect
the virtual bucket booking limits as does DV. Code share itineraries are valued as
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Figure 4-8: Local, Connecting, and Code Share Class 6 Closer Rates
locals with standard DAVN and with BPS, thus producing nearly identical local clo-
sure rates. On the other hand, DV increases the number of bookings predicted in
higher value buckets, and thus increases the closure rates. In the case of connect-
ing itineraries, the more accurate (and more frequently zero) shadow prices produce
better booking limits on legs with high-value connecting itineraries.
4.3 Other Network and Leg RM Combinations
This section presents a summary of the results of different combinations of network
with network RM, and network with leg RM. For consistency with the results in
Jain (2011), the optimization frequency was kept at once per time frame for DAVN
and EMSRb, and once every 200 bookings for ProBP and HBP. There are no DV
results for the symmetric HBP scenario because HBP does not separate locals from
code shares in its recording and forecasting, as it is based purely on leg forecasts and
records code share bookings by leg and bucket. There are differences between the
results of single and dual control for the ProBP and HBP cases because the optimiza-
tion and BPS do not occur simultaneously (each airline can reach 200 bookings at
different times from the partner). Note that the implementation of DAVN with BPS
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in this thesis differs from Jain (2011), as discussed in the beginning of the chapter.
The implementation used here results in lower revenue benefits from BPS because the
prior implementation obtained some of the positive effects of DV when calculating
the virtual bucket booking limits. The first two columns of Table 4.7 show the results
of the prior DAVN implementation for comparison.
Prior DAVN BPS New BPS
% over Sarne RM (no BPS/DV) Implementation Results I Dynamic
Symmetric RM Single
DAVN (SP Exchange) 0.14
DAVN (EMSRc Exchange) 0.08
ProBP*
HBP
Asymmetric Network RM
DAVN/PROBP (SP Exchange) 0.08
ProBP/HBP
Asymmetric Network/Leg RM
DAVN/HBP -0.01
DAVN/EMSRb -0.09
*ProBP single control results differ from dual
exchange is not simultaneous if optimization
Dual
0.29
0.25
Single
-0.16
-0.10
0.00
0.05
Dual Valuation
0.03 0.30
0.04 0.28
0.05 0.24
0.06 N/A
0.17 -0.03 0.05 0.31
0.02 0.10 0.15
0.17 -0.06 0.09
0.15 -0.20 0.07
control because timing of bid
is based on booking count
0.17
0.16
price
Table 4.7: Benefits of BPS and DV with Various Network and Leg RM Combinations
It is clear that, in all cases, BPS with dual control produces marginal benefits
(the bold column). BPS with single control often produces losses, especially if one of
the airlines is using leg RM. At least some benefits may be obtained from BPS with
dual control, more so in the case when one of the airlines is using some form of net-
work RM, even with less frequent optimization. DV also produces consistently larger
gains in revenue than BPS. This is because the valuation of code share itineraries is
increased significantly due to their high network value in network A4, compared to
the case where they are valued at the local fare.
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4.4 Chapter Conclusions
With regard to the frequency of optimization as it relates to the performance of the
two network RM methods, ProBP and DAVN, we have seen that increasing the fre-
quency of optimization from occurring at the start of 16 TFs, to daily, helps ProBP
(+.44%) much more than DAVN (+.22%). ProBP benefits more from the increased
frequency of optimization because it does not have built-in booking limits the way
that EMSRb or DAVN do, automatically shutting down a fare class once the limit
is reached. So long as a booking fulfills the ProBP bid price equation, there is no
limit to the number of bookings in a fare class that may be accepted until the next
optimization occurs. In reality, the network value of a marginal seat on a flight leg
changes with every incremental booking. Thus, more frequent updating of bid prices
is especially important for bid price RM systems.
On the other hand, DAVN consists of several heuristics that create built-in robust-
ness to inaccuracy, with revenue value ranges to define the virtual classes, and virtual
class booking limits to prevent too many low fare bookings in between optimizations.
Thus, it does not benefit as much as ProBP from increased frequency. Average shadow
prices and their variances are found to decrease from daily optimization because esti-
mates of the ratio of demand to remaining capacity are more accurate. Average bid
prices in ProBP are also found to decrease. In ProBP, lower bid prices on legs with
connecting traffic cause an increase in connecting traffic and revenue. For DAVN, the
decrease in shadow prices results in the placement of connecting itineraries into higher
value buckets, and stricter booking limits on lower value buckets (i.e., allowing fewer
low-fare bookings), which results in more high-fare bookings in all traffic components.
The result of more frequent optimization is a better fare class mix across all traffic
components for both ProBP and DAVN.
It is clear from all of the experiments that BPS with single control is generally
detrimental to revenues, regardless of the RM combinations used. In each case, BPS
with single control is too permissive of accepting code share bookings compared to
dual control, which has a more rigorous acceptance criteria by requiring that the
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availability equations of both airlines are satisfied. In addition, the permissiveness
of BPS with single control also causes declines in local and connecting bookings and
revenues, displacing those passengers by giving too much preference to code shares.
The gains from BPS with dual control (about +.05%) and DV (+.25-.30%) are
similar for ProBP and DAVN, and consistent across optimization frequencies. DV
increases ProBP bid prices because of the high value of code share itineraries in
network A4, causing large code share and local revenue gains, but falls in connecting
traffic and revenues due to displacement by code share and local passengers, which are
found to be more beneficial to the network by the optimizer. The same is not true for
BPS, where bid prices decrease in early time frames, and revenue gains are minimal.
In DAVN, BPS increases total traffic and thus shadow prices. However, unlike the
ProBP bid prices, DV decreases DAVN shadow prices because of a decease in total
traffic, causing more forecasts below capacity and more zero shadow prices. This
causes a beneficial "spiral up" in booking limits.
Combining the DAVN and ProBP results with the results from various network
and leg RM combinations presented in Section 4.3, we conclude that revenue gains
may be attained by airlines in alliances even when some partners use less sophisticated
RM methods, and less frequent optimization. As long as both airlines participate in
the code share itinerary availability decision by using BPS with dual control, or if code
share itineraries have high network value (relative to local and connecting itineraries)
and the partners use DV, then revenue gains can be obtained for the alliance from
sharing bid or shadow prices from relatively infrequent optimizations.
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Chapter 5
Results in Network E
This chapter provides a thorough analysis of the results for alliance network E, which
was introduced in Chapter 3. The first part of the chapter provides a similar analysis
to that of Chapter 4, demonstrating the benefits for network RM, BPS and DV, of
more frequent optimization that produces more current bid prices, shadow prices, and
booking limits. The chapter then proceeds to analyze the performance of BPS and
DV for alliances 1 and 2 (comprising airlines 1 and 3, and 2 and 4, respectively) in
network E at two demand levels, corresponding to the network load factors of 83%
and 86% in the network RM scenarios without BPS or DV.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The results when alliance 1 uses
network RM (then applying BPS or DV), and the competitor, alliance 2, uses EMSRb,
are presented first. The analysis first focuses on the benefits of daily optimization for
BPS or DV, which prove to be acute in network E. Then, the results obtained when the
competitor also uses the same type of network RM as alliance 1, but is not yet using
BPS or DV, are shown. We then present the results for the competitive scenarios when
alliance 2 rather than alliance 1 uses network RM, and applies BPS or DV. Finally, the
results when both alliances use symmetric network RM and BPS or DV are presented.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide summaries of the important characteristics of the four
airlines in alliance network E in the baseline case for the medium and high demand
levels, respectively, including load factors, revenues, and traffic details. Note that
all four airlines use EMSRb in the network E baseline case, which was not the same
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in alliance network A4, where the 2 competitor airlines, 1 and 3, used DAVN and
AT90, respectively. The percent revenue gains from network RM over the network E
baseline (where all airlines use EMSRb) are larger in network E than in network A4
at similar load factors.
Code share traffic percentages (the last column) include both own and partner
code share passengers for each alliance airline, because code share passengers occupy
seats on both airlines' flight legs.
% Load Revenue % % % Code Passengers % % % Code
Airline Factor (000s) Local Connecting Share Carried Local Connecting Share
1-EMSR 82.6 1625 43 31 26 5911 51 29 20
2-EMSR 83.0 1820 48 30 22 6390 55 27 18
3-EMSR 83.2 1610 39 36 25 6182 51 30 19
4-EMSR 82.5 1652 43 32 25 5679 48 31 21
Table 5.1: Medium Demand Baseline Characteristics of Network E by Airline
% Load Revenue % % % Code Passengers % % % Code
Airline Factor (000s) Local Connecting Share Carried Local Connecting Share
1-EMSR 88.0 1743 43 31 26 6289 51 29 20
2-EMSR 88.4 1953 48 30 22 6814 55 27 18
3-EMSR 89.1 1729 39 36 25 6600 51 30 19
4-EMSR 88.4 1772 43 33 25 6084 48 31 21
Table 5.2: High Demand Baseline Characteristics of Network E by Airline
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide breakdowns, at medium and high demand levels, respec-
tively, of the percentages of revenue and traffic generated by the three components,
local, connecting, and code share, for the alliance as a whole. In network E, average
code share fares are much lower, in relative terms, than they were in network A4.
Average code share fares are only two to three times the local and connecting average
fares. Compared to network A4, a similar percentage of revenues are provided by
code share passengers, connecting passengers represent a smaller proportion of rev-
enues, and locals a larger proportion. However, a substantially larger proportion of
code share passengers are carried than in network A4.
The relatively lower average code share fares for both alliances in network E are
the result of the fact that code share flights comprise a long-haul, trans-Atlantic flight
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leg, and at least one short haul leg. However, own connecting flights of any airline in
one of the two alliances in network E may also comprise a long-haul and a short-haul
leg (own connecting itineraries may also comprise two short-haul legs, which results
in an overall lower average connecting fare). Whereas in network A4, the code share
flights could include up to two long-haul legs, and own connecting itineraries could
not, thus resulting in relatively higher average fares for code shares as compared to
own connecting itineraries. Also, in network E, alliance 2 also has a lower average
code share fare than alliance 1, and a substantially higher average local fare. Locals
are the largest revenue source for alliance 2, and alliance 1 relies more on connecting
and code share passengers for its revenues.
Component Alliance % Bookings % Revenue Average Fare
Local 1 57 41 2
2 57 46 255
Connecting 1 33 34 305
2 32 31 307
Code Share 1 11 26 704
2 11 23 695
Table 5.3: Medium Demand Baseline Combined Alliance Revenue and Traffic
Components
Component Alliance % Bookings % Revenue Average Fare
Local 1 56 41 217
2 57 46 256
Connecting 1 33 34 307
2 32 31 309
Code Share 1 11 26 707
2 11 23 694
Table 5.4: High Demand Baseline Combined Alliance Revenue and Traffic Compo-
nents
Now that we have introduced the chapter and presented some key aspects of net-
work E, we proceed to the results in ProBP, followed by DAVN, for the cases described
earlier.
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5.1 Frequency of Optimization in Network RM,
BPS and DV
This section, like Chapter 4 did for network A4, demonstrates the benefits of daily
optimization over optimization at the start of 16 time frames for the network RM
methods of ProBP and DAVN, and the additional benefits of applying the alliance
RM techniques of BPS and DV.
% Revenue Changes
TF Optimization 200 Bookings Daily Opt'zation
5
.
0 9 5.00
* ProBP 412 4.17 4.27 4.22
3.87 3.891
* ProBP + BPS
M ProBP + DV
Figure 5-1: ProBP: Alliance Percent Change in Revenues over Baseline
Figure 5-1 shows that ProBP with daily optimization (calculation of prorated bid
prices for all the legs in the network) gains +.79% over TF optimization, for the high
demand scenario with an average network load factor of 86%. With daily optimiza-
tion, BPS performs better than DV by about +.05%, but BPS does not outperform
DV when optimization is at each time frame, in which case DV performs +.05% better
than BPS. Note that network E (at 86% LF) carries fewer total passengers than A4
( 83% LF), so optimization every 200 bookings occurs less frequently (closer to TFs)
than in network A4, thus providing gains only slightly larger than TF optimization.
Looking at Figure 5-2, we see that as in network A4, daily optimization creates
revenue gains in all traffic components by similar amounts for no BPS, BPS and DV.
Gains are highest in the connecting traffic component (about +20 thousand), and
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second highest in the code share components (about +7-9 thousand), as in network
A4. Also, switching from TF to daily optimization, when using BPS, produces larger
revenue increases in the code share component than the increases when using DV.
Local
* ProBP
* ProBP+BPS
" ProBP+ DV
32 34 34
TF Optimization
Conx
63 65 62
Daily Optimization
CS Local Conx CS
80 85 81
3 r n 352 54
;; 36 38 1a
Figure 5-2: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Revenues (000s) Compared
to EMSRb Baseline
T
Local
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" ProBP+BPS
" ProBP + DV
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18
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Local
Daily Optimization
Conx
-53-52-50
-569-5656
-606 -578 -581602
Figure 5-3: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Traffic Compared to
EMSRb Baseline
Figure 5-3 presents the changes in traffic in the three components. Daily opti-
mization takes fewer locals, but other changes are not as prominent. Despite the
decline in local passengers, the revenues increase in this component, indicating that
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the bid prices more accurately reflect the value of empty seats, and that they result
in booking acceptance decisions that carry more high fare passengers than is the case
for TF optimization.
The total code share passengers carried remains largely unchanged. The only
other notable change is that, for BPS, applying daily optimization results in a larger
reduction of connecting passengers. At both optimization frequencies, DV carries no-
tably fewer connecting passengers and more code shares than either BPS or network
RM without BPS, indicating that DV creates a preference for code share passengers
over connecting passengers on routes that carry a large proportion of code share pas-
sengers. Also, though there are declines (or a very slight rise for DV) in connecting
passengers with daily optimization, the revenue gains are large, indicating that the
booking acceptance decisions are, as for locals, improving the fare class mix.
Change in Total Alliance
Opt'n No BPS BPS
TF -574 -562
DAILY -638 -635
TF Optimization - Averag
Local 222----
Conx 380---
CS -- 742---
Daily Optimization - Aver
Local ----- 224---
Conx 386 388
CS 747 749
Bookings
110
DV 100 -
-573
-634 90
80
e Fares 70
221
384 60
734 50
age Fares 40
30
390
20739 TF
Airline 1 Average Bid Prices
- -.-.
-TF opt/No BPS - Daily/No BPS
-TF opt/BPS -- Daily/BPS
-TF opt/DV '..Daily/DV
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Figure 5-4: (Left) Change in Total Passengers from EMSRb
Average Fares. (Right) Average Bid Prices by Time Frame
Baseline, Component
Figure 5-4 shows the average bid prices for ProBP with no BPS, BPS, and DV in
network E. We can see that, as in network A4, DV results in higher average bid prices
than the other two methods, whereas BPS results in lower bid prices than standard
ProBP with no BPS (particularly in the TF optimization case), thus allowing slightly
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more connecting and local bookings to occur in that case. On the other hand, the
higher bid prices, due to DV, on routes with many code share passengers results in
fewer connecting bookings in favor of code shares.
DV and BPS both cause increases in connecting fares, but DV produces large falls
in code share fares (unlike in network A4). Recall that the average code share fare in
network E is not as high, relative to local and connecting fares, as it was in network
A4. This means that applying DV may not always raise the bid prices on routes with
many code share passengers if the partner bid price is relatively high, but may in fact
lower them, thus accepting too many low-fare code share bookings and lowering the
average code share fare. BPS increases both average connecting and code share fares,
but does not produce an increase in average bid prices because the valuation of code
share itineraries remains the same as that of local itineraries.
5.1.1 DAVN for Alliance 1
Figure 5-5 shows that revenue gains are only +.12% from daily optimization above
those from TF optimization, which is a very small improvement compared to the
gain from DAVN in general, and smaller than the gain in network A4 even at a
lower network load factor. Also, unlike in network A4, the performance of BPS and
DV is severely affected by how up-to-date the bid prices are, with benefits only if
optimization occurs daily.
When optimization occurs daily, BPS and DV produce large gains in connecting
and code share revenues, as shown in Figure 5-6, but these gains do not occur with
standard DAVN (without BPS or DV). The directional changes for switching from
TF to daily optimization are indicated by red arrows, and the further changes from
applying BPS and DV are indicated by black arrows. In the local component, there are
moderate gains from daily optimization that are consistent for no BPS, BPS and DV.
When using standard DAVN, Figure 5-7 shows that local traffic increases from
switching to daily optimization. Local traffic further increases, to a very large extent,
from BPS and DV when optimization is at time frames, but the increase is signifi-
cantly smaller with daily optimization. This indicates that the moderate increases in
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Figure 5-5: DAVN: Alliance Percent Change in Revenues over Baseline
revenues in the local component, due to BPS and DV when using TF optimization,
come at the expense of carrying many more local passengers. These additional local
passengers displace the connecting passengers, and cause large declines in connecting
revenues. The same is not true in the daily optimization case, where BPS and DV
cause a much smaller rise in local passengers, and a much smaller decline in connect-
ing passengers. Thus, after applying BPS or DV, the modest revenue gains in the
local component remain, but do not cause such declines in the connecting revenues.
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Figure 5-6: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Revenues (000s) Compared
to EMSRb Baseline
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Figure 5-8: (Left) Change from EMSRb Baseline in Total Alliance Bookings,
Component Average Fares. (Right) Average Bid Prices by Time Frame
BPS or DV produce increases in the number of code share passengers, and further
applying daily optimization increases revenues more than the BPS/DV increase in
the TF optimization case. These results are very different from those obtained in
network A4, where the frequency of optimization had little impact on the success of
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Daily Optimization
BPS and DV applied to standard DAVN.
Figure 5-8 shows the average shadow prices for the various scenarios. Shadow
prices also fall with daily optimization, as in network A4. Also, like in network A4, all
shadow prices start out at about the same level in the first time frames. However, a key
difference is that BPS and DV cause very large rises in shadow prices in later TFs with
TF optimization, whereas this is not so extreme for daily optimization. Shadow prices
rise most from BPS with single control and least with DV (like the A4 DAVN case).
Although DV (with daily optimization) produces the best revenue gains, average
shadow prices barely change from the values of no BPS with daily optimization, other
than being slightly lower in early TFs, but slightly higher in later TFs. In comparison,
shadow prices increase in all BPS scenarios.
5.1.2 Summary
As in network A4, ProBP gains significantly from optimizing daily (+.79%) due to
more current bid prices. Revenue gains occur in all components, primarily in con-
nections, and a fall in local traffic also occurs. Code share average fares increase due
to BPS only with daily optimization, but they actually decrease with DV regardless
of optimization frequency. This is because the average code share fares in network
E are not as high relative to local and connecting fares, and DV can result in lower
bid prices on some routes with heavy code share traffic, accepting more low fare code
share passengers than without DV. For ProBP, there are always gains from BPS and
DV (.25-.43% at 86% LF), increasing somewhat with more frequent optimization.
DAVN benefits only marginally from daily optimization (+.12), mainly in local
revenues, due to a local traffic increase and higher average code share fares. However,
BPS and DV only produce gains under daily optimization, when shadow prices are
much more current, average connecting fares increase, and low fare local passengers
do not displace connecting passengers as they do with TF optimization and BPS or
DV. Code share fares never increase above those with standard DAVN, but BPS with
dual control results in the highest code share fares of BPS and DV.
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5.2 Alliance 1: BPS and DV at Different Demand
Levels
In this section, we move to daily optimization in all cases, and focus on the benefits of
BPS and DV for alliance 1 at two demand levels, 83% and 86% network load factors
(LFs). We will examine how the modified alliance network E benefits from daily BPS
or DV when used by alliance 1.
5.2.1 Alliance 1 uses ProBP
The following subsection describes the results obtained when alliance 1 uses ProBP,
then applying BPS and DV. The subsection is divides into two parts, where the
competitor, alliance 2, uses EMSRb or ProBP (without BPS or DV).
Competitor Alliance 2 uses Leg RM
Figure 5-9 shows that BPS and DV, when applied to ProBP with daily optimization
used by alliance 1, both cause important percent revenue gains for alliance 1 over
the EMSRb baseline, in the case when the competitor uses EMSRb. DV produces
larger revenue gains than BPS at medium demand, and the effect is reversed at high
demand. The LFs for the alliance increase due to BPS and DV as a result of more
long-haul itineraries being booked. At high demand, DV causes a larger increase in
the LFs of the alliance than BPS because it increases the sales of long haul code share
itineraries even more than BPS, but this does not cause as much of a revenue gain.
Figure 5-10, showing the changes from baseline in revenue (thousands) and traf-
fic at high demand in the same chart, illustrates that alliance 1 revenue gains come
from code share revenues and traffic, with larger gains in both from DV than BPS.
DV causes the largest falls in connecting traffic and takes the most local and code
shares bookings. BPS produces better total revenue gains than DV by gaining the
most revenue in connections and locals, and making better code share decisions (i.e.,
taking fewer code share and local bookings than DV).
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Figure 5-9: Alliance Percent Change in Revenues over EMSRb Baseline (Alliance 2
uses EMSRb)
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Figure 5-10: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Traffic and Revenues
(000s) Compared to EMSRb Baseline
Competitor Alliance 2 also uses Network RM
Figure 5-11 shows that gains from network RM with daily optimization are halved
when both alliances use ProBP. This occurs because the revenue gains from network
RM methods, which occur from the RM system generating improved booking avail-
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ability decisions that better account for the network value of local and connecting
itineraries, are now divided between the two alliances.
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Figure 5-11: ProBP: Alliance Percent Change in Revenues over EMSRb Baseline
(Alliance 2 uses ProBP)
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Figure 5-12: High Demand: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Traffic
and Revenues (000s) Compared to EMSRb Baseline
Just like in the prior case when the competitor used leg RM, BPS outperforms DV
at high demand, whereas DV performs best at medium demand. At high demand,
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the stricter control of code share itineraries with BPS prevents code shares from oc-
cupying the seats of high-revenue own local and connecting passengers. Whereas,
in the medium demand scenario, DV performs better by accepting more code share
passengers, which do not displace high-revenue own local and connecting passengers
when demand is relatively low and there are more remaining seats.
We can see in Figure 5-12 that, unlike the prior case, network versus leg RM, now
more local passengers are carried, and the largest revenue and traffic gains come from
that component (no longer from connections). More so for DV, but also for BPS,
revenue gains come from code share (and local) revenues and traffic. Large falls in
connecting traffic do not have a large effect on connecting revenues, indicating that
both methods improve the fare class mix of connecting traffic.
5.2.2 Alliance 1 uses DAVN
The following subsection describes the results obtained when alliance 1 uses DAVN
with daily optimization, and the two alliance airlines both exchange shadow prices or
EMSRc values when applying BPS and DV. The subsection is divided into two parts,
like the previous ProBP discussion, where the competitor uses EMSRb or ProBP
(without BPS or DV).
Competitor Alliance 2 uses Leg RM
We can see from Figure 5-13 that BPS only produces gains at high demand, and the
gains are similar for EMSRc and SP exchange. The gains are higher for dual control
(.24 to .30%) than for single control, exactly as we have seen before. However, at low
demand, both SP and EMSRc exchange actually produce small revenue declines of
about -.03% from standard DAVN. On the other hand, DV produces gains at both
demand levels, but the gains are marginal at medium demand (.04%) and increase to
as much at .40% at high demand.
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Figure 5-13: DAVN (SP or EMSRc Exchange): Alliance Percent Change in Revenues
over EMSRb Baseline (Alliance 2 uses EMSRb)
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Figure 5-14: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Traffic and Revenues
(000s) Compared to EMSRb Baseline (DAVN SP Exchange)
Figure 5-14 shows the breakdown of component traffic and revenues (in thousands)
for the high demand scenario when the alliance partners exchange shadow prices. Al-
though DV does not produce the largest gains in any single component, it loses less
than BPS in connecting revenues while gaining substantially in locals and code shares.
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The large fall in connecting traffic combined with a small decrease in connecting rev-
enues indicated that the connecting traffic fare class mix is improved, and the decline
in passengers creates room for an increase in local and code share bookings.
Competitor Alliance 2 also uses Network RM
In the case where the other alliance also uses network RM, just as we have seen in
the prior section, DV consistently performs better than BPS for alliance 1, raising
revenues by +.11-.15% for both medium and high demand levels. Also, BPS with
dual control performs almost as well as DV, and better than BPS with single control,
which gains slightly even at high demand (+.01-.06%). As before, the exchange of
shadow prices of EMSRc values does not produce important differences in the results.
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Figure 5-15: DAVN (SP and EMSRc Exchange): Alliance Percent Change in
Revenues over EMSRb Baseline (Alliance 2 uses DAVN)
Unlike in the case where the competitor uses leg RM, BPS produces gains even
at medium demand. The more sophisticated RM of the competitor creates a positive
feedback effect that reflects well on alliance 1 as well. When the competitor is also us-
ing a more sophisticated RM method such as DAVN, then low fare classes on certain
itineraries are may not be available on any alliance airline. As a result, passengers
will be more likely to buy the next highest available fare on either alliance, resulting
102
in benefits to both alliances that may not have been present in the scenario where
the competitor used a leg-based RM method such as EMSRb.
5.2.3 Summary
For alliance 1, DV with daily optimization generally leads to the highest revenue
gains for both DAVN and ProBP under medium demand, however, ProBP with BPS
performs better than DV at high demand. When the competitor also uses ProBP,
the pattern of gains over standard ProBP is similar, but smaller.
With DAVN for alliance 1 and EMSRb for the competitor, BPS does not improve
revenues at the medium demand level because code share gains do not make up for
losses in connecting (and local) revenues (the component revenue breakdown was not
shown for medium demand). DV gains +.06% through better local and good code
share revenues, but still loses connecting revenues. At high demand, gains occur
from both BPS and DV. When the competitor uses DAVN as well, the order of gains
from BPS and DV remains the same, but all methods produce revenue gains at both
medium and high demand levels because of a beneficial competitive feedback effect.
5.3 Alliance 2 uses BPS or DV while Alliance 1
Does Not
This section shows the results obtained when alliance 2 (which has different charac-
teristics than its competitor), rather than alliance 1, uses BPS and DV. We show the
results for the medium and high demand scenarios, as before, where network load
factors are about 83% and 86%, respectively. We discuss the results from two scenar-
ios: alliance 2 using network RM, and competitor alliance 1 using leg RM (EMSRb),
and the competitor also using the same network RM (ProBP or DAVN). All results
involving network RM use daily optimization, and all changes shown are relative to
the baseline case where all four airlines use EMSRb.
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5.3.1 Alliance 2 uses ProBP
Figure 5-16 illustrates that BPS generally produces the largest revenue gains for al-
liance 2 at each demand level, and in each competitive case, regardless of whether
the competitor uses EMSRb or DAVN. At medium demand, the revenue gains due
to BPS are relatively small, at about +.08%, in both the case where the competitor
uses EMSRb and also the case where the competitor uses ProBP. The benefits of BPS
increase further at high demand, to as much as .38%, whether the competitor uses
leg or network RM. However, relatively small gains from DV remain, though not as
large as they were for alliance 1, indicating that alliance 2 does not benefit as much
from DV as did alliance 1.
Ntwk v, Leg RM % Revenue Changes Ntwk v. Ntwk RM % Revenue Changes
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Figure 5-16: Alliance Percent Change in Revenues over EMSRb Baseline (Left:
Competitor uses EMSRb, Right: Competitor uses ProBP)
Figure 5-17 shows that at higher LF, the gains from BPS are due to large rises
in connecting bookings revenue. However, code share revenues actually decline from
both BPS and DV. Although the small code share revenue decline from BPS paired
with the large fall in code share passengers indicates an improved fare class mix, the
same is not true for DV. DV takes just as many code share passengers but produces
a fall in code share revenues, a smaller increase in connecting revenues, and a fall in
local revenues as well. For BPS, taking fewer code share passengers leaves more room
for connecting bookings, and results in more revenues.
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Figure 5-17: High Demand: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Traffic
and Revenues (000s) Compared to EMSRb Baseline (Alliance 1 uses EMSRb)
5.3.2 Alliance 2 uses DAVN
When alliance 2 uses DAVN with daily optimization and applies BPS or DV, the only
benefits occur from BPS with dual control at high demand, as seen in Figure 5-18.
Although a tiny gain of +.02% occurs with DV at high demand when the competitor
uses EMSRb, this does not hold true when the competitor uses DAVN. At medium
demand, all of the methods cause losses.
Ntwk v. Leg RM % Revenue Changes
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Figure 5-18: Alliance Percent Change in Revenues over EMSRb Baseline with DAVN
SP Exchange (Left: Competitor uses EMSRb, Right: Competitor uses DAVN)
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Figure 5-19: High Demand: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Traffic and
Revenues (000s) (Competitor uses EMSRb, Alliance 2 uses DAVN with SP Exchange)
Figure 5-19 shows the changes in revenue and traffic components for alliance 2.
When alliance 2 uses BPS and single control or DV, there occur minor gains in code
share revenues from carrying more code share passengers, but the minor gains do not
make up for losses in connecting bookings and revenues.
However, BPS with dual control performs well by actually taking the least code
share passengers while but losing little code share revenue, indicating an improved
fare class mix. This also leaves some room for local and connecting bookings, thus
gaining revenues in those segments. These observations are very similar for EMSRc
exchange (for which the component breakdown is not shown).
5.4 Both Alliances use BPS or DV
This section shows the results obtained when both alliances start out using network
RM, and then both apply BPS or DV. We show the results for a high demand sce-
nario, where network load factors are about 86%. We first present the results for
ProBP and then for DAVN, in each case with daily optimization.
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5.4.1 Both Alliances use ProBP
Figure 5-20 shows that BPS and DV both help alliance 1 marginally, with DV pro-
viding only slightly higher revenue gains. However, for alliance 2, BPS results in even
more minor gains of only .02%, and DV causes large losses of -.28%. These losses
are accompanied by falls in the LF for alliance 2, whereas alliance 1 increases its LFs
slightly. These results indicate that only BPS with dual control consistently helps
both alliances.
% Revenue Changes System Load Factors
Alliance 1 Alliance 2 Alliance 1 Alliance 2
88.6 ----------- *------
N ProBP 1.942.002.02 87.6 - 87.4 87 5 87.
1.631.65 86.6 - 86.185.885.9
* ProBP + 1.35 85.6 -
BPS 4.6
83.6
M ProBP + DV 82.6
831.6
80.6
*Baseline LFs: 82.8 (Medium) 88.4(High)
Figure 5-20: Both Alliances use ProBP: Percent Change in Revenues over EMSRb
Baseline
Figure 5-21 shows the revenue component changes from baseline for each alliance,
and Figure 5-22 shows the traffic component changes. We can see that the lower LFs
for alliance 2 are due to fewer code share passengers carried using network RM, and
further LF falls are due to declines in code share passengers. The minor gains of BPS
come from gains in connecting and local revenues that barely offset the falls in local
revenue.
Alliance 1 gains code share and local revenues with both BPS and DV, making up
for losses in connecting revenues. These gains come from improved fare class mix in
local traffic. The ratio of traffic to revenues indicates that BPS produces a better fare
class mix in code share traffic than DV, but DV a better mix in connecting traffic.
107
,I
Alliance 1 Change In Revenues
Local Conx CS Local
66 68
Alliance 2 Change in Revenues
Conx CS
67
3540 41 35
18 12 11 14 18 18
I
M ProBP
C ProBP+BPS
M ProBP+ DV -""-329
-40 -39
Figure 5-21: Change from EMSRb Baseline in Local, Connecting, and Code Share
Revenues (000s)
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Figure 5-22: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Traffic
Figure 5-22 shows that for alliance 2, code share traffic declines, more from BPS
than DV, having increased a lot from ProBP alone. It is clear that the structural
differences between the two alliances produce different changes due to the application
of network RM. DV only helps alliance 1, but harms alliance 2, because of underlying
structural differences between the alliances, in terms of the proportion of revenues and
traffic, and the average fares, in the local, connecting, and code share components.
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For example, the larger decline in load factors for alliance 2 than alliance 1 following
the application of ProBP, and then BPS or DV, is because alliance 2 experiences a
fall in the length of trips taken on its network. Local passengers, with their relatively
high average fares, are given preference over connecting passengers (as can be seen
in Figure 5-22, but this is not true to the same extent as for alliance 1. In addition,
BPS for alliance 2 results in a decline in code share bookings, and an increase in local
passengers, whereas the opposite occurs for alliance 1.
5.4.2 Both Alliances use DAVN
Figure 5-23 indicates that DAVN produces much larger gains for alliance 1 than it
does for alliance 2. Though this was also true for ProBP, the gap was not nearly as
large. Secondly, it is clear that the results for DAVN are consistent with the ProBP
case. Alliance 1 benefits marginally from BPS (more so from BPS with dual control,
as expected), and more from DV. In fact, the benefits from DV are more substantial
(+.12%) in the DAVN case than in the ProBP case.
SP Sharing % Revenue Changes EMSRc Sharing % Revenue Changes
Alliance 1 Alliance 2 Alliance 1 Alliance 2
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Figure 5-23: Both Alliances use DAVN (SP or EMSRc Exchange): Percent Change
in Revenues over EMSRb Baseline
The same is not true for alliance 2, which experiences small revenue gains (+.06%)
only from BPS with dual control, in fact gaining more than in the ProBP case. DV
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and BPS with single control both cause losses for alliance 2, with the largest losses
from DV, like in the ProBP case. The results are similar whether SPs or EMSRc
values are exchanged.
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Figure 5-24: Change in Local, Connecting, and Code Share Revenues (000s), DAVN
SP Exchange
The difference in the performance of the two alliances are due to their inher-
ent structural differences causing different reactions to network RM, BPS, and DV.
Looking at Figure 5-24, alliance 1 gains code share revenues when using BPS or DV,
having started out with a smaller revenue gain in code shares from standard DAVN.
In addition, the remaining revenue gains come from gains in the local component,
while there are losses in connecting revenues from BPS and DV.
Alliance 2 actually loses code share revenues from all methods. It also gains local
revenues from all methods, and the largest local revenue increases are with BPS and
dual control, just as for alliance 1. However, the reason why BPS with dual control
is the only method that produces an overall revenue increase for alliance 2 because
only it produces improved connecting revenues as well. BPS with single control and
DV cause losses in that component.
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5.4.3 Discussion of Differences between Alliances 1 and 2
We have seen that BPS with dual control is the only method that consistently helps
both alliances. BPS with dual control works best for alliance 2 in all cases, while DV
works best for alliance 1. The reason that DV works better for alliance 1, and not
as well for alliance 2 (sometimes not working at all), is because of differing network
parameters. Recall that alliance 1 obtains a larger percentage of revenues from code
share and a smaller proportion from local itineraries. Alliance 2, on the other hand,
obtains less revenue from code share and more from local itineraries. In addition,
alliance 2 has a lower average code share fare than alliance 1, and a much higher
average local fare.
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Local 6 N ProBP
217 M ProBP+BPSCode share fares start lower * ProBP+DV
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Figure 5-25: Alliance 1 and Alliance 2 ProBP Average Local, Connecting, and Code
Share Fares
Figure 5-25 illustrates the average component fares for alliances 1 and 2, and shows
how the average fares change after the application of ProBP, and additionally BPS
and DV. Code share fares increase more for alliance 1 than for alliance 2 when apply-
ing network RM and further alliance RM techniques. Connecting fares also increase
much more for alliance 2 than alliance 1, making that component more important for
revenues. When DV is used by alliance 2, subtracting the already higher bid prices
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(resulting from the higher local fares of alliance 2) from the lower code share fares
causes spiral down and harms revenues. This does not occur for alliance 1 because of
its inherently higher code share fares and lower local fares.
5.5 Chapter Conclusions
When using DAVN, the frequency of optimization is a key factor affecting the per-
formance of BPS and DV in network E. When shadow prices are calculated every 7
days during the first portion of the booking process, and the partner uses these stale
shadow prices for determining code share flight availability, the result is detrimental
to revenues.
The DAVN heuristic results in many more low fare local bookings, which occupy
the seats that are not being sold as parts of code share itineraries. With the high
shadow prices in the TF optimization with BPS or DV scenario, the lack of code share
bookings filling the seats on the short-haul domestic legs leaves them open for low-fare
local passengers. The DAVN booking limits are also only recalculated 16 times, which
does not allow the updating of booking limits on low-fare local itineraries at a rate
that is fast enough to keep up with changes in the state of the system. The version
of DAVN used in the PODS simulation only uses eight virtual buckets. Experiments
with 16 virtual buckets produced smaller revenue declines, but did not correct the
problem. Because this DAVN implementation may not represent the current or most
sophisticated practices of some airlines, the results obtained here are not generalizable
to all DAVN implementations.
The same is not true for ProBP. As observed in network A4, even exchanging
dated bid prices for use in code share availability control via BPS or DV, calculated
at the start of 16 time frames, results in revenue gains for the alliance above those of
standard ProBP network RM. These revenues gains are higher, however, with daily
optimization of bid prices, whereas the percent revenue gains from BPS or DV were
the same in network A4 regardless of the frequency of optimization.
The revenue gains are still present for alliance 1 even when alliance 2 uses network
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RM as its revenue management method rather than EMSRb. However, the resulting
revenue gains are smaller when the competitor uses a more intelligent RM system.
Alliance 2 also benefits from BPS when the competitor uses EMSR, but less than
the benefit for alliance 1. When the competition uses network RM, the revenue gains
are smaller than they were for alliance 1 as well.
When both alliance use BPS or DV, alliance 1 retains a revenue gain from BPS
and DV. The gain for alliance 2, in this situation, is very minor will BPS. DV, how-
ever, causes losses for alliance 2 when its competitor also uses DV. Recall that code
share average fares are lower for alliance 2 than for alliance 1, and average local fares
are higher. Also, locals comprise the largest proportion of revenues for alliance 2, and
code shares a smaller proportion, as compared with alliance 1. The lower code share
fares combined with the higher local fares results in a spiral down effect for alliance 2
when using dynamic valuation, whereas the competitor does not experience a revenue
decline because of different network characteristics.
In network E, which differs from network A4 in terms of its physical structure, the
properties of the types of flights (short-haul local and domestic connecting, along with
long-haul international code share flights), the benefits of BPS and DV depend on the
network characteristics and how current the bid prices are to a larger degree. If code
share flights are high-revenue relative to local itineraries, then BPS and DV improve
revenues by raising bid prices (ProBP) or improving booking limits (DAVN). These
benefits are more pronounced, and do not affect the revenues from the other traffic
components, when code share itineraries comprise a larger proportion of revenues.
If, however, the airlines in an alliance do not obtain the majority of revenues from
code share traffic and the average code share fare is relatively low compared with
the average local fare, then the potential danger of displacing a local passenger and
causing revenue loss presents a problem for implementing BPS and DV.
The benefits from BPS and DV are present in most cases for alliances of differ-
ing structure, and they are larger if the competition is using less sophisticated RM
methods. Additionally, if two competing alliances differ in their network character-
istics such that one carries higher-revenue code share passengers and obtains a large
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amount of revenues from that component, then it could experience a larger benefit
from BPS and DV to the detriment of the competitor.
The results indicate that the frequent optimization of bid prices and booking lim-
its may be particularly important in networks with a large difference in the lengths of
their sets of flight legs, intense competition between two alliances, and semi-restricted
fare structures in some parts of their networks that are prone to spiral down.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis examined revenue management (RM) and seat availability control methods
that airline alliance partners can adopt to improve the total revenues of the alliance
without formally merging. Partners can share information about the network oppor-
tunity costs of selling seats on their flight legs, called "bid prices". The exchange of
bid prices among alliance partners, termed bid price sharing (BPS), allows airlines
participating in alliances to incorporate information about the estimated value of
seats on their alliance partners' flight legs into their decisions about which code share
itineraries to accept or reject. The timeliness of the bid price exchange and the fre-
quency of calculation of bid prices throughout the booking process were also analyzed.
Cooperative alliance seat availability control methods involving BPS improve code
share itinerary availability decisions because the presence of code share flights presents
a problem for individual airline RM systems. Because partners do not jointly opti-
mize revenues on code share flights, alliance revenue gains from implementing origin-
destination (O-D) availability control (also called network RM) may be lower than
an individual airline's gains.
In BPS code share availability control, the leg bid prices of the two alliance part-
ners are compared against the total code share itinerary fare, and if the fare value
exceeds the sum of the bid prices, then the code share itinerary is available for book-
ing. Under single airline control, only the partner selling the itinerary (the marketing
partner) checks that the fare exceeds the sum of the bid prices that it has on hand,
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but under dual control, both airlines check that the code share fare is higher than the
bid price sum. Single and dual control will result in different code share acceptance
decisions if the bid prices used by the partners in their evaluations differ. If so, then
dual control will result in the acceptance of fewer code share bookings because the
code share fare must exceed the larger of the two bid price sums.
Dynamic valuation (DV) is a method that modifies the perceived value associ-
ated with a code share itinerary, given as input to an airline's RM system, dynami-
cally throughout the booking process. Rather than being valued the same as a local
itinerary traversing the same flight legs that a code share itinerary does, DV values
the code share itinerary at the total code share fare less the partner's bid price on its
operated flight legs. The advantage of DV is that it incorporates recent information
about the status of the operating partner's legs in the RM system of the marketing
partner. The disadvantage is that modifying the valuation of code share flights in the
RM system can be more difficult to implement than BPS seat availability control, and
can also affect the availability of own local and connecting itineraries through altered
bid prices and booking limits, because their modification affects the entire network.
6.1 Research Findings
A simulation-based research tool called the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator
(PODS) was used for the experiments in this thesis. Several RM techniques, which
attempt to optimize airline revenues at the flight leg or network level, were tested in
conjunction with BPS, in two alliance network environments. The US-based network
A4 comprises four airlines, all with hubs in the central region of the US, with one
alliance, and two other non-allied airlines. In network E, two competing airlines in the
US and two in Europe make up two competing trans-Atlantic alliances. The average
fares of code share itineraries, relative to those of own (non-code share) local and
connecting itineraries, are much higher in network A4 than in E, but the proportion
of code share revenues and passengers is higher in network E than in A4.
With regard to the frequency of the RM system's optimization, and thus the fre-
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quency of bid price calculation and exchange, it was found that optimizing daily,
versus at the start of 16 time frames throughout the booking process, provides higher
revenue gains for both ProBP and DAVN. The gains from more frequent optimization
are higher for ProBP than for DAVN. ProBP is based on optimal proration of fares
across the entire network, and depends on the accuracy of estimates of forecasted
demand to remaining capacity for bid price calculation. Therefore, using the most
recent booking data for the calculation of ProBP bid prices will produce bid prices
that better reflect the current value of empty seats. For the heuristic DAVN, the
more frequent optimization provided gains that were at most half as large as those of
the ProBP case. However, DAVN, optimized at the start of each time frame, starts
out providing larger revenue gains than ProBP.
Of the two simulation networks tested in this thesis, exchanging bid prices from
more frequent optimizations was found to be much less critical to the success of BPS
and DV in network A4 than in network E. In network A4 at 83% load factor, the
additional gains from BPS with dual control and DV (+.03 to .06% and +.24 to .29%,
respectively) above standard network RM were found to be very similar regardless of
the frequency of optimization.
However, in network E, the optimization frequency was found to have an impor-
tant effect on the success of BPS and DV, that was also different for the two network
optimizers ProBP and DAVN. The following conclusions are for the results in net-
work E when the competitor used EMSRb. With ProBP in network E, exchanging
bid prices from optimizations that occurred at the start of 16 time frames produced
further revenue gains of +.25 to +.30%, for BPS and DV, respectively, beyond stan-
dard network RM. The gains of exchanging bid prices from daily, as opposed to time
frame, optimization were almost 50% higher (+.34 to .43%), with BPS performing
better than DV at high optimization frequencies.
The results were different for DAVN, where bid price exchange from optimiza-
tions at each time frame caused revenue losses of -.62 to -.26%., which were worst for
BPS with single control. On the other hand, daily optimization with BPS and DV
produced large gains that reached +.40% when the alliance partners used DV and
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exchanged DAVN leg EMSRc values as bid prices.
Chapter 4 of this thesis served as a continuation of the work of Jain (2011) and
presented the results related to BPS and DV in PODS alliance network A4. The
implementation of DAVN with BPS was modified so that the EMSR virtual bucket
booking limits used local code share valuation instead of the total code share fare
less the partner's leg bid prices. Also, rather than requiring the code share fare to
exceed the sum of own EMSRc value and partner bid price, this implementation
required that the code share fare minus partner bid price fall into an open DAVN
virtual bucket. This implementation is more consistent with DAVN treatment of own
connecting itineraries. The prior BPS implementation obtained some of the benefits
of DV, and was also more strict by using EMSRc values instead of minimum open
bucket values as the own bid price. Because of these differences, this thesis's revenue
gains for BPS in DAVN are not as high as those observed in Jain (2011).
The large revenue gains with DV in network A4 that were first presented in Jain
(2011) with the exchange of dated bid prices from the prior time frame, were shown
here to be similar with the exchange of current bid prices from time frame and daily
optimization. The large magnitude of the revenue gains was due not only to the
incorporation of partner bid prices into the code share valuations, but also because
of the very high revenue value of code share itineraries in network A4, which caused
an increase in average bid prices and generally stricter acceptance criteria for all
traffic components. Thereby, the fare class mix of local, connecting, and code share
itineraries was improved.
However, the promising results with DV in network A4 were shown to hold only
partially in the different setting of alliance network E, as shown in Chapter 5. For
alliance 1, which obtains a large share of revenues from code share and connecting
traffic as compared with local traffic, and has relatively low average local and con-
necting fares relative to average code share fares, the gains from DV were higher than
those for BPS in nearly all cases. At high demand, the benefits were larger if the
competitor, alliance 2, used EMSRb as its RM method, but the revenue gains were
still present, though slightly diminished, when alliance 2 also used network RM. At
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medium demand under DAVN, competitive feedback effects actually increased the
revenue gains for alliance 1 from BPS or DV when the competitor also used DAVN.
On the other hand, alliance 2 was not found to benefit as much as alliance 1 from
BPS or DV because of differences in its network characteristics. Alliance 2 obtains a
larger share of revenues from local traffic as compared with the share from code share
and connecting traffic, and has higher average local fares than alliance 1, as well as
lower average code share fares. Also, applying network RM raised alliance 2's average
connecting fares much more than for alliance 1, but did not raise average code share
fares significantly. The combination of higher average local fares and lower code share
fares caused spiral down for alliance 2 when it applied DV. When the competitor was
also using network RM and DV, alliance 2 suffered revenue losses from using DV.
In the cases where the alliance partners use DAVN as their network RM method,
either leg shadow prices from the network LP or EMSRc values for the flight legs may
be used as bid prices. The results of this thesis showed that the revenue changes from
BPS and DV are very similar regardless of which type of bid price is exchanged. The
actual technique, whether it is BPS with single or dual control, or DV, is what ulti-
mately determines the change in revenues. The changes in the component revenues
and fare class mixes were also very similar for the two different types of bid prices.
We can conclude that the exact form of the bid price is less important than whether
it provides useful information to the partner about the value of a seat on the code
share flight leg, and can thus be used by the partner to aid in making better code
share availability decisions.
BPS with dual control was found to improve revenues in nearly all cases tested,
providing revenue gains up to .40% above standard network RM. Gains were al-
most always positive, though sometimes only marginal. However, this was the only
method that consistently performed well for each alliance in the various network,
demand level, and RM method combinations. At higher demands in network E, this
method produced much better results than at medium demands, indicating that as
seats become scarce in that network, making better code share availability decisions
is especially important for revenues.
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On the other hand, BPS with single airline control can cause revenue declines from
standard network RM by accepting too many code share bookings at the expense of
potentially higher-revenue local or connecting bookings, as it overrides standard avail-
ability control. This result is true for both alliance networks. When both airlines use
ProBP as their RM method and exchange bid prices simultaneously, the results of
single and dual control are identical because the bid price sum equations of both
airlines are the same. However, single and dual control produce different results in
DAVN when using the bucketing criteria, because the airline partners may have dif-
ferent minimum open virtual buckets on their flight legs even if they exchange bid
prices simultaneously.
DV is a method that should be approached carefully. It can produce large rev-
enue gains in certain networks. However, it is necessary that code share itinerary
fares be high-value relative to own local and connecting itineraries in order to justify
incorporating the modified valuations into the RM optimization step, thus affecting
the availability of own local and connecting itineraries. If code share fares do not
provide high network value relative to own local and connecting itineraries, then it
is not justified to modify their valuation in the optimizer because of the potentially
detrimental effects this can have on availability decisions for the local and connecting
components. In that case, using local valuation of code share itineraries instead, and
applying BPS with dual control may be a more reliable, less risky solution for an
alliance seeking to improve its code share availability control decisions.
6.2 Implications for Airlines
These results are generally encouraging and imply a trade off for airlines in terms
of the costs of implementation. The exchange of leg bid price information first re-
quires that code share itineraries are recorded and forecasted separately from local
itineraries, which means that the airline must receive full information of the flight
legs comprising the code share booking, and not only the legs that it operates. Next,
the exchange of leg bid price information is required as a first step before any of the
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methods discussed and tested in this thesis can be used. It is then possible for the al-
liance to implement BPS with single airline control by comparing the code share fare
with the sum of the bid prices on all the legs traversed. However, as we have seen in
the results of this thesis, unless the partners use ProBP with simultaneous exchange
of bid prices, BPS with single control will perform more poorly than BPS with dual
control, and may result in revenue losses compared to standard network RM methods.
Therefore, although it is simplest for airlines to implement BPS with single control
as their code share RM method, it is not guaranteed that this method will provide
revenue benefits if the airlines simultaneously use different bid prices for the same
flight leg (the case with DAVN, asynchronous ProBP, and other methods). This is
true even if optimization occurs frequently and very recent bid prices are exchanged.
There are technological complexities to dual airline control, which would require
instant availability evaluation from both partners before a booking request is ap-
proved. Though code share seat allocation is not performed jointly over the entire
alliance network, we have seen that BPS with dual control still represents an im-
provement. Gains can reach as much as +.43% in the best case scenario of ProBP
at high demand, and +.40% for DAVN, can be marginal (+.02-.05%), or can even be
slightly negative (-.02%) at low demand levels. The range of gains from BPS with
dual control depends on the network structure, nature of demand, the optimization
frequency, and the RM behavior of the competitor. Competitive feedback effects can
reverse the benefits of some methods, especially if they are ill-suited to the airline's
structure. This was demonstrated in the case of the losses experienced by alliance 2
when using DV simultaneously with alliance 1.
The cost and difficulty of implementing BPS with dual control is higher than BPS
with single control, but the gains are certainly higher. Regarding DV, however, it
is less clear that it would appeal to airlines because of the direct modification of in-
puts to the RM optimizer, and the effect that this modification would have on the
availability decisions for own local and connecting itineraries. It may be more techno-
logically difficult to dynamically modify the code share valuation, using the partner's
bid prices, in the optimizer prior to the RM optimization step. The appeal of BPS
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with dual control is that it is a post-fact, add-on mechanism that does not require
any modification to the operation of the existing RM system. Implementation is a
one time investment, and the benefits will be compounded over time. Whether BPS
is a worthwhile investment is ultimately for the airlines to decide.
For a large airline that participates in an alliance such as Lufthansa or United,
with yearly revenues of over $30 billion, the actual gains from implementing dual
control BPS, assuming an approximate percent revenue gain of +.15%, translate into
over $45 million dollars per year. Considering the difficulties faced by large net-
work airlines, which have struggled to report operating profits in general since airline
deregulation and especially since the year 2000, small revenue benefits can make a
big difference. This research has shown that alliance partners can cooperate and
share their bid prices, whether they take the form of expected values of empty seats
on flight legs, or network displacement costs approximated as shadow prices from a
deterministic LP, to attempt to improve the total alliance revenues. Through the
use of bid price sharing for post-fact code share itinerary availability control, or for
dynamically valuing the code share itinerary's revenue contribution in the network
optimizer, airlines in alliances can improve their revenues and affirm the benefits of
entering into code sharing agreements.
6.3 Future Research Directions
The two networks, A4 and E, used in this research had specific network structures
that resulted in somewhat different conclusions about the performance of BPS and
DV. Expanding this research to networks of various other structures, and with other
characteristics (i.e., the ratios of the average code share fare to local and connecting
fares, and the proportions of revenue derived from the various traffic components)
would help to compile a more holistic picture of the benefits of BPS and DV as a
function of network structure.
Some literature on the alliance RM topic (Wright, 2010) has modeled the effects
of partners choosing which bid prices to post for their own flight legs to maximize
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their own individual revenues, assuming that that the posted bid price is equal to
the "transfer price", or the revenue that will be received by the operating partner if
the itinerary is sold (revenues are not split according to a prorate agreement in this
case). In addition to this "partner price" scenario, it is possible that some degree of
bid price scaling (either up or down), in certain cases, would produce better avail-
ability decisions. A topic for further research is the effect on total alliance revenues
of modifying bid prices for either mutual or individual benefit.
This thesis was concerned with the combined alliance revenues and has assumed
that the revenue resolution contracts are fixed and have been negotiated such that
each partner views his share as a fair division. Another direction for future research
is to examine the effects of different revenue resolution schemes or prorate agreements
between alliance partners on the behavior and incentives of individual participants.
Some airlines use fare adjustment (also called "marginal revenue optimization"),
which decreases the fare inputs to the optimizer of lower class itineraries (Fiig et al.,
2010). Some bid prices will be much lower if using fare adjustment. The performance
of BPS may be significantly different if airlines are using this method. An idea
suggested by Darot (2001) is that of bid price inference, where the lowest available fare
on a flight leg is used as a pseudo-bid price. If actual bid prices are skewed downwards
because of techniques like fare adjustment, then using lowest available fares may be a
feasible alternative. Bid price inference is also applicable in the case when airlines do
not have antitrust immunity to share bid prices, in which case communicating to each
other the lowest available fares (which are public and would not require immunity) is
still possible. Research on the success of BPS when using pseudo-bid prices because
it is unsuitable or infeasible to exchange actual bid prices is another topic of interest.
We have seen that DAVN performs well as a network RM method because its com-
position of multiple heuristics makes it robust, and alone (without BPS) it produces
large revenue gains even without frequent optimization. However, in the network E
environment, applying BPS or DV to DAVN with time frame optimization resulted
in large revenue losses. The work of Jain (2011) showed that a different, stricter
implementation of BPS in DAVN, using the higher leg EMSRc values rather than
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minimum open buckets as own bid prices resulted in better performance. Also, using
the total code share fare minus the partner bid price for the calculation of virtual
bucket booking limits also produced stricter EMSRb virtual bucket booking limits
and better revenues. Because DAVN comprises multiple heuristics, it may require
airline-specific tweaking to obtain maximum performance. Further research into the
adjustments needed to improve the performance of BPS in DAVN, and in what situ-
ations such adjustments are appropriate, would be of practical importance.
Also of practical importance to the industry is to test BPS and DV with different
RM combinations that are not limited to the O-D control methods of DAVN and
ProBP. We have tested various network and leg RM combinations in network A4, but
it is important to continue this research for networks of varying structures as well,
and confirm whether BPS with dual airline control remains the only method that
consistently delivers revenue gains, though marginal in some cases.
To the author's knowledge, most of the airlines in alliances are only just taking
the first steps towards sharing bid price information and incorporating it into their
code share availability decisions. A major limitation of the models and methods pro-
posed in the literature thus far is that they were tested on relatively small and simple
hypothetical networks. Other than this thesis, the author is unaware of literature
that also examined the performance of alliance RM in a competitive alliance envi-
ronment. Once such alliance RM systems are in place as those proposed here and
in the literature, data documenting the code share availability decisions and actual
mechanisms used by airlines in real world competitive and network scenarios can be
collected. The success of the various methods proposed here and elsewhere in the
literature can then be validated according to real airline data.
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